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No. 142 EAST 19TH STREET,  
New York City,

FEBRUARY 25TH, 1884.

DEAR JUDGE DALY :

At your desire, I send to you, with pleasure, the notes of the address I had the honor to read to the American Geographical Society on the evening of February 18th, concerning "The Growing Power of the Republic of Chile." They comprise some of the observations made during a rapid journey among the belligerent republics of the South Pacific, undertaken by the request of your associate member, Mr. James Gordon Bennett. For incompleteness in their substance or style I beg charitable indulgence, in consideration that they have been written with inevitable haste during very scanty intervals in the routine of a journalist.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Your obedient servant,

ALBERT G. BROWNE, JUN'R.

To the Honorable

CHARLES P. DALY,

*President of the American Geographical Society.*

# THE GROWING POWER OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE.

BY

ALBERT G. BROWNE, JUN'R.

MR. PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN  
GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY:

I will apply the evening you have invited me to occupy to some consideration of "The Growing Power of the Republic of Chile in the Pacific." There are sound reasons why the United States should be the foremost of the American Powers whose territory borders on that ocean, and the fact that we are suffering ourselves to be surpassed there in political influence, in commerce and in naval strength, by a country whose population is less than a twentieth of ours,\* merits more notice than is accorded by Congress or the public.

In the course of what I have to say I shall make frequent mention of the five years' war between Chile on the one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other, from which those republics are emerging; and you will find the map upon the screen an assistance to the narrative. It represents the section of the South Pacific coast which was the scene of that struggle. The schedule of some of the Pacific capitals and ports which is also hung upon the screen will

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\*The last Chilean census was taken on April 19, 1875, and gave the total population of the Republic as 2,075,971. According to the estimate of the Chilean Bureau of Official Statistics, made as of December 31, 1883, the total population at the beginning of the present year is 2,377,949. That is less than the estimated population of the State of Missouri on the same date, and is just about the present estimated population of New York City and its suburbs within a radius of ten miles.

help you in computing distances—allowing 60 geographical miles, or in round numbers 70 English statute miles, to a degree of latitude.\* In longitude Lima, the capital of Peru, is about three degrees west of New York, and Santiago, the capital of Chile, is more than three degrees east,

* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—		LATITUDE NORTH.
San Francisco.....		37° 46'
MEXICO—		
Acapulco.....		16° 50'
UNITED STATES OF COLOMBIA—		
Panama.....		8° 56'
ECUADOR—		LATITUDE SOUTH.
Quito.....		0° 13'
Guayaquil.....		2° 20'
PERU—		
Tumbez.....		3° 33'
Payta.....		5° 5'
Cajamarca.....		7° 8'
Trujillo.....		8° 6'
Lima.....		12° 2'
Ilo.....		17° 36'
Rio Sama.....		17° 58'
Tacna.....		18° 00'
Arica.....		18° 28'
Pisagua.....		19° 36'
Iquique.....		20° 12'
Rio Loa.....		21° 28'
BOLIVIA—		
La Paz.....		16° 30'
Antofagasta.....		23° 40'
CHILE—		
Coquimbo.....		29° 57'
Valparaiso.....		33° 2'
Santiago.....		33° 27'
Angol.....		37° 42'
Punta Arenas in the Straits of Magellan.....		53° 10'
Cape Horn.....		55° 59'



I.

I assume sufficient acquaintance on your part with the history of Chile down to recent times to dispense with any but a rapid reference to it.\* Situated wholly in the temperate zone—found by the Spanish conquerors in possession of the most warlike of all the South American Indians, whose resistance persisted for centuries after the principal dominions of the Incas had succumbed—underestimated in its capacity of wealth, because that seemed to consist chiefly of grazing and agriculture—Chile held for hundreds of years the relation of a poor and humble, almost a despised, dependency to the Viceroyalty of Peru, although styled a “kingdom” in the decrees of the Spanish crown. The silver ores in the Chilean province of Atacama were discovered by a shepherd so lately as 1832. Indeed, all the

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\* This assumes a more widely diffused intelligence on the subject in the United States than the most recent historian of the South American colonies finds in England. See *Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period*, by R. G. Watson (London, 1884), vol. 1, pp. x-xii.

Mr. Watson complains that “even some men holding high office in the Royal Geographical Society, who are familiar with the latest discoveries near the North Pole and in the interior of Africa, with Central Asia and with Australia, have somehow in their range of study overlooked South America.” And yet the gentleman who makes this complaint (himself trained in the British diplomatic service in South America) is guilty of such serious errors as the assertion, on p. 249, that the cities destroyed by the Araucanians near the close of the sixteenth century “have never been rebuilt,” and “the present Valdivia (in Chile) is only a garrison,” whereas, on the contrary, it was rebuilt in 1644, and is now a flourishing city with a population officially estimated at 6,000.

For another recent illustration of gross British misinformation, see Mrs. Brassey's *Voyage in the Sunbeam* (Am. ed.), p. 184, where, in an entry made in her journal, in Santiago itself, on October 27, 1876, she writes about “Panama hats, which are made in Lima, Guayaquil and other States of Chile, as well as in Panama,” thus enumerating the capital of Peru and the principal seaport of Ecuador as “States of Chile,” and attributing the manufacture to which she alludes to a country in which it is not carried on.

greatest mineral riches of the country—the copper and nitrates and coal, as well as the silver—are of recent development, though as to the precious metals—certainly as to gold—they were more or less known to the Incas. There is a legend that the bulk of the ransom paid by Atahualpa to Pizarro came from Chile.\* Tales of this kind, of course, attracted dashing and brilliant adventurers at an early day, but the peril and hardship of working the gold mines was so great that gradually the colonists came to consist in large part of poor and hardy immigrants, mostly from the northern provinces of Spain, whose blond type is still conspicuous among the Chilean whites.†

As to government, court favorites sought in preference appointments in Mexico and Peru, as sources of aggrandizement, in a way of which the rapacious disposal of the offices in Cuba is a surviving example. Santiago, the Chilean capital, except as a stage for promotion, was esteemed as undesirable a post as a British governor now might deem St. Johns, in Newfoundland, in comparison with Ottawa. Upon the west coast of South America Lima was the point where greed and ambition were centered. In the seventeenth century there were twenty-nine creations of noblemen in Peru by Spanish kings. In the eighteenth century there were fifty-four.‡ Many of

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\* See on this whole subject *La Edad del Oro en Chile*, por B. Vicuña Mackenna (Santiago, 1881); also *El Libro de la Plata*, by the same author (Santiago, 1882).

† That type, to be sure, as all students of Spanish history and literature are aware, is not exclusively peculiar to those provinces; but it can usually be traced back to them. The great Cervantes, for example, who had blue eyes and auburn hair, was a native of Castile; but his family was of Galician origin.

‡ See Peru, by C. R. Markham (London, 1880), p. 101.

the titles are still held in abeyance by Peruvian families.\* Chile, happily for her future, was not a field for the easy attainment of riches and honors. So lately as 1810—the year of the declaration of Chilean independence—the revenue of the “kingdom” of Chile amounted only to \$400,000 a year.

The one great structure in Santiago which was built by order of a Spanish king—the Moneda, now used both for a mint and for the executive offices of the Republic—is the subject of a characteristic story to illustrate the rank of Chile among Spanish possessions. It was erected in the reign of Charles III., near the close of the last century, at a cost of a million and a half of dollars, and is several hundred feet square, with court yards in the interior. To account for so vast an expenditure in such a place, the story was invented that what the King meant to order in Santiago was the building of a prison, and in Mexico of a mint at the same time, but that the orders were transposed. And I have heard an addition to the tale, that when the error was brought to the King's attention he refused to acknowledge it, on the ground that it was impossible for a King of Spain to make a mistake. The whole legend is denied by modern historians;† but it is so significant of the esteem in which Chile was held that it might well be true.

Thus escaping foreign rapacity by reason of the supposed poverty of their “kingdom,” the colonists of Chile were abandoned to self-government more than the inhabitants of

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\* But what is more considerable than any terrestrial titles which fell to the share of Colonial Peru, she contributed several saints to the Catholic calendar. Of these the most romantic is Santa Rosa, the patroness of the City of Lima, who was born in 1586, died in 1617, and was canonized by Pope Clement X. in 1671. Her feast day is August 30.

† See Chile Ilustrado, por R. S. Tornero (Santiago, 1872), p. 24.

any other Spanish possession in the New World. They occupied the narrow central valley of the present dominions of the Republic, that lies between the Andes and a coast range of mountains through which numerous rapid rivers break a passage to the sea. This valley varies from fifty to a hundred miles in width, and is five hundred miles long, stretching from latitude  $33^{\circ}$ , a little way above Santiago, down to latitude  $41^{\circ} 30'$ , about the difference in latitude between Charleston, in South Carolina, and New York.\* Then the coast breaks up into a labyrinth of islands, reaching down to the Straits of Magellan. Cape Horn, which belongs to Chile, is in latitude  $55^{\circ} 59'$ .†

Valparaiso, the port of Santiago, distant from it about seventy miles westward (187 kilometres by railroad), and situated in latitude  $33^{\circ} 1' 56''$ , was until half a century ago of but little commercial importance save as a calling-place for

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\* There are some points of resemblance in its relation to mountains and the sea, in dimensions and in latitude, between this great valley in the southern hemisphere and the Kingdom of Portugal (which extends from lat.  $36^{\circ} 57'$  to  $42^{\circ} 8'$  north), that invite comment, which the limits of this address do not permit.

† The most convenient manual of the geography of the country is the *Diccionario Jeográfico de la República de Chile*, por F. S. Asta-Buruaga (New York, 1867). Señor Asta-Buruaga, long the Minister of Chile to the United States, where he is affectionately remembered, is at present Chief of the Bureau of Official Statistics at Santiago, whose publications, by their intelligent arrangement and accuracy, have won for the Chilean Government a well-deserved reputation of late in that branch of political science. This, however, is a popular hand-book of the nature of a gazetteer, and fills a different function from the works of Don Amado Pissis or those of Don Ignacio Domeyko, who has just retired from the rectorship of the University of Chile upon a liberal pension voted to him by Congress. The names of these distinguished Chilean geographers, as also those of the eminent Peruvian geographers, the brothers (Don Mateo and Don Mariano Felipe) Paz Soldan, and Don Antonio Raimondi, deserve most honorable mention in any assembly of American men of science. One of the greatest misfortunes consequent upon the present war is the interruption of the official publication of Señor Raimondi's explorations by the Peruvian Government. A trigonometrical survey of any one of the three belligerent republics remains, however, yet to be undertaken.

vessels circumnavigating the Cape. In the seventeenth century it was sacked by buccaneers. In the eighteenth it was twice destroyed by earthquakes, and in the present century again it was almost destroyed by an earthquake in 1822.\*

The consequence was that the colonists smelted with the vigorous Indians, and developed a new race that I venture to believe is destined to play a great part in American history, of which its recent military and naval successes against Peru and Bolivia are only the prelude. Indian blood pervades not only the middle and lower orders of the people, but many of the most powerful and wealthy families also, and no such contempt attaches to the mixture as does in most other Spanish-speaking countries. For example, Don Manuel Montt, a recent President of the Republic, and Don Antonio Varas, the present venerable President of the Senate—whose united names give the title Monttvaristas to a numerous political party—both came of mixed Spanish and Indian origin. No other element than the Indian and the White enters into this new race. Negro Slavery, which was not abolished in Peru till 1856, never had a deep foothold in Chile,† nor has there been any

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\* There are elaborate histories of the municipalities of Santiago and Valparaíso by Señor Vicuña Mackenna, scarcely surpassed in fulness of all desirable details by any similar publications concerning cities of England or of the United States.

† See *Sketches of a Journey in Chile and the Argentine Provinces in 1849*, by Lieut. I. G. Strain, U. S. Navy (New York, 1853), pp. 113–4. Lieut. Strain says ;

Slavery in Chile was abolished by Carrera while at the head of the revolutionary government in 1811. I often had occasion to remark upon the limited number of negroes in Chile, particularly in the interior, which in this respect contrasts not only with Brazil, but with Buenos Ayres, Montevideo and Peru. Upon inquiring of a very intelligent Chilean, whose exalted position, thorough education and experience gave him a good opportunity of judging, I was informed that most of the Chilean negroes who had been freed by Carrera enlisted in the army of San Martín, and were left by him in Peru and Buenos Ayres.

considerable importation of Chinese laborers. The consequence is a great simplicity in the composition of the population as compared with that of Peru. A catalogue of thirteen different half-castes is needful to illustrate diversities of race and color in Peru, and the process of assimilation there is so incomplete that in an estimate of the distribution of the Peruvian castes in 1875, 12½ per cent. of the 2,500,000 population was assigned to pure white blood, and as much as 57 per cent. to pure Indian blood, and the remainder was divided among negroes, Chinese and half-castes, after allowing 2½ per cent. to foreigners.\* But in Chile there is only one half-caste, and that comprises more than four-fifths of the population. Of the Araucanian Indians there remain scarcely more than 50,000.†

The fighting capacity of this Chilean race displayed itself in the wars for independence at the beginning of this century. Although the first struggle was unsuccessful, and the liberty

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\* See the *Anuario Mercantil* (Lima, 1875), p. 55.

† The prudent and sagacious policy of the Chilean Government of late years has been to subdue this remnant of its inveterate Indian foes by the influences of a peaceful civilization. This policy was fully organized by Don Adolfo Ibañez during his incumbency as Minister of Foreign Relations and Colonization, in 1872, under the Presidency of Errázuriz. The result is that they are hemmed between powerful civilized settlements which are closing upon them from the north and the south. With such success had this policy been prosecuted up to the beginning of the hostilities with Peru and Bolivia, that offers were made by Araucanian chiefs of recruits for the Chilean army for service against the foreign enemy. Now that the war is practically over, the Government is putting fresh vigor into the policy and preparing to traverse the Indian territory with railroads. On January 23, 1884 (only last month) President Santa Maria, accompanied by his cabinet, inaugurated the work on these railroads upon the spot, with a remarkable speech in which he paid an eloquent tribute to the heroism of the resistance of the Araucanians to Spain and (since the independence of Chile) to the Republic, and expressed his confidence that the arts of labor and of education (*el trabajo y la escuela*) will soon accomplish what military force and religious persuasion (*la fuerza y la fé*) have essayed in vain during centuries.

of Chile was not accomplished till San Martin brought succor from the eastern side of the Andes and won the battle of Maipo in 1818, yet as soon as it was achieved, the victors, under their Argentine leader, united their forces with those of Bolivar and Sucre for the liberation of Peru, which was proclaimed at Lima on the 28th of July, 1821, and confirmed in the battle of Ayacucho on December 9, 1824, that decided the expulsion of Spain from the continent.\*

Then followed the organization of Alto-Peru—the Switzerland of South America in its geographical position—into the Republic of Bolivia. Its territory, which for centuries of Spanish sway was subject to the Viceroyalty at Lima, had been transferred to the Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres during the last half-century before independence. The creation of Bolivia was an event that lies at the foundation of almost all the modern political and military history of the west coast of South America. From that time Chile has steadily aimed to restrain Bolivia and Peru from a union, and twice has gone successfully to war to prevent it.

First, under the guidance of her great statesman, Don Diego Portales—whose heart is exhibited in a glass urn in the Catholic graveyard on the summit of one of the hills of Valparaiso, and whose statue in bronze stands in front of the Moneda in Santiago. After his assassination in 1837, his policy was not discontinued, and the dissolution of a Peru-Bolivian confederation was effected by the defeat of

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\* A monograph of remarkable interest concerning the victor at Ayacucho, General Sucre, afterwards the first President of the Republic of Bolivia, the most brilliant of the military leaders of the South American patriots in the wars of liberation, has been published within a few months. See *El Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho—el Asesinato*—por Antonio Flores (New York, 1883). His fame, as well as San Martin's, has been unduly eclipsed in popular appreciation in the United States by that of Bolivar.

its Protector, Santa Cruz, by a Chilean army under General Bulnes at Yungay, on January 20, 1839. Again, in the war which began five years ago, and is only now drawing to a close, one of the incentives was an alliance secretly contracted between Peru and Bolivia in 1873.

During the interval of forty years between these wars the distinguishing feature of the government of Chile was its passage into the permanent control of civilians, while the other governments of the west coast remained prizes for military chieftains.

The present constitution of Chile was framed under the auspices of Portales so lately as May 1833;\* and yet, in a constitutional convention in Ecuador, Don Antonio Flores last month called attention to the fact that although it has subsisted only half a century it is the oldest written national constitution in force in all the world, except our own, unless we include the Magna Charta of England in the category. General Don Manuel Bulnes, the victor at Yungay, who succeeded President Don Joaquin Prieto, in whose time this constitution was adopted, was the last soldier-President of Chile. His term expired in 1851. His five successors during the intervening thirty-three years—Don Manuel Montt (1851–1861), Don José Joaquin Perez (1861–1871), Don Federico Errázuriz (1871–1876), Don Annibal Pinto (1876–1881) and Don Domingo Santa Maria,† all have been

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\* The best edition of the Chilean Constitution and uncodified legislation is that of J. B. Lira, in three volumes (Santiago, 1879).

† Some of the strong personal traits of Don Domingo Santa Maria are indicated in the following extracts from a letter printed in the *New York Herald* of October 8, 1883:

When the Chilean President is a man of such vigorous will as Montt or Santa Maria, his office, very powerful at all times, becomes almost tyrannical in its sway over public policy. The circumstances would be extraordinary in which he could not dictate his own successor. As a matter of fact, I believe



civilians trained in minor official posts. Perez, who in his youth fought in the war of independence, was the only one of them, I believe, who ever bore arms.

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that under the operation of the present constitution and political system of Chile the only way in which the control of the Government ever has been shifted from one party to another has been by a shifting of partisan allegiance by the President himself. \* \* \* In Santiago and Buenos Ayres and some other South American cities there are serio-comic illustrated newspapers of a degree of cleverness which entitles them to be better known in other countries than they are. That in Santiago is entitled the "Padre Cobos," and its constant appellation for President Santa Maria is "Domingo Siete," apparently in allusion to his fondness for courses out of harmony with the regular ways of action. This significance comes to be ascribed to the phrase from a fairy tale which is familiar to every child in Chile. "Domingo" is the Spanish word for Sunday and "siete" for seven. The story runs that one evening a good little hunchback strayed from his village into a neighboring wood and by accident caught sight of the fairies dancing in a glade. Fearful of being discovered he climbed a tree and watched the revels from a crotch among the foliage. They sang, as they danced, a verse reciting the first three days of the week, as follows:

Lunes, Martes, Miércoles, tres.

After listening for a while he framed a rhyme upon the next three days and sang:

Jueves, Viernes, Sabado, seis.

Instantly there was a fluttering among the little folk and a consultation with the Fairy Queen, by whose order a squadron dragged him down from his perch and led him before her for sentence. But instead of punishing him she confessed herself so pleased with the rhyme that in reward for its merit she lifted the hump from his back and ordered her attendants to stow it away among the paraphernalia of the fairy court, and dismissed him with an injunction to tell no one. But when he returned home the astonishment of the villagers at seeing him straight and symmetrical was so great that he was tormented with questions, to which he yielded, whereupon a bad little hunchback, who learned the secret, resolved to try his own fortune with the fairies. Going to the wood the night of the next full moon he climbed to the crotch and soon saw them dancing again in the glade, and as they danced they were singing:

Lunes, Martes, Miércoles, tres,  
Jueves, Viernes, Sabado, seis,

whereupon he shouted in pursuance of his plan:

Y Domingo, siete.

And he was greatly pleased to find himself immediately arrested and hauled before the Queen, as he had expected. But instead of lifting off his hump she directed the hump of the other to be brought out of the storeroom and fastened on his back. "This is in punishment for your inharmonious addition to our song," said she, "and for your clandestine way of working." And he went back to the village with two humps.

But notwithstanding this characteristic of seeking his ends by secret and often indirect courses (a characteristic acknowledged by his warmest admirers), President Santa Maria (born August 4, 1825) is by confession even of his foes a magistrate entitled to a place in the front rank of South American states-

The progress Chile has made during this period in the qualities of a well-ordered commonwealth is a tempting theme. But it must suffice to say that the time has passed without the forcible overthrow of any Government, and even without any very formidable attempt at revolution save at the election of President Montt in 1851; that a system of public education, independent of ecclesiastical control, has been organized, Montt being its patron;\* that an

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men, by his intellectual power and indomitable will. A radical from the start, despite the restraining influences of distinguished family connections and early official station (he was *oficial mayor* of the Ministry of Justice in 1847 and in 1848 was appointed by President Bulnes Intendente of the province of Colchagua), he was one of those young rebels who fled from Chile in consequence of their frustrated rising against President Montt in 1851. That term of absence he passed in Peru. Returning at the end of a year and applying himself to the profession of the law, another attempt against Montt's authority sent him into exile again in 1859—this time to England and the European Continent. But with the initiation of the change of the tone of the Government from conservatism to liberalism, and with his own radicalism chastened by experience, after his second return home he was enabled to enter official life again, and as soon as 1864 he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of President Perez. From that time forward he has been constantly in public station, executive or legislative, and in President Pinto's Cabinet, in connection with the war against Bolivia and Peru, he held successively the portfolios of Foreign Relations and of the Interior, so that he became Pinto's natural successor. His rival for the Presidency was General Baquedano (the victorious general in the battles of Tacna, Chorillos and Miraflores), who, however, withdrew from the contest before the election.

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\* Mrs. Mary Mann, in a biographical sketch of Don Domingo F. Sarmiento, of the Argentine Republic, who, in 1842, during a period of exile in Chile, founded "the first normal school that was opened on this side of the Atlantic," says:

Not ten years before the foundation of the Normal School the courts of Santiago had condemned a robber, who had stolen the candelabra of the Virgin in the Church of San Merced, "to serve as a schoolmaster in Copiapó for three years," as they would have condemned him to be whipped or to labor in the penitentiary.

See Sketch annexed to Life in the Argentine Republic, or Civilization and Barbarism, from the Spanish of D. F. Sarmiento, by Mrs. Horace Mann (New York, 1868), pp. 348-9, *note*.

One of the most lamentable consequences of the concentration of the

extensive State railroad system has been accomplished, its chief development occurring in the administration of President Perez; that under Perez also an interpretation was given by Congress to a clause of the constitution declaring the Roman Catholic to be the religion of the Republic, which permits religious toleration;\* that in the same

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energies of Chile upon war is the diminution of facilities for public primary education since 1878. The number of primary schools in the Republic has shrunk alarmingly during the long struggle. The importance of the subject is recognized by the Government, and gave rise to interesting debates in the Chamber of Deputies in Santiago last July.

The accomplished Minister of Chile at Washington, Don Joaquin Godoy, informed me not long ago that he has instructions to make a report concerning the possible employment of female teachers from the United States on a considerable scale. My own observation and inquiries satisfy me, in consideration of the difference of the social civilization of Chile from that of our country, besides the difference of language, that a better plan would be for the Government to send a large number of young women to the United States to be fitted in our normal schools for the business of teaching, and to carry home and apply in Chile the system in which they would be trained here.

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\* This clause of the Chilean constitution is Article 5, in these words:

La religion de la República de Chile es la Católica, Apostólica, Romana; con exclusion del ejercicio público de cualquiera otra.

The law of Congress which construed this so that religious toleration was thenceforth practiced was passed on July 27, 1865, bears the signatures of President Perez and of Federico Errázuriz, who was at that time Minister of the Interior, and reads as follows:

Se declara que por el artículo 5 de la Constitucion se permite a los que no profesan la religion Católica, apostólica, romana, el culto que practiquen dentro del recinto de edificios de propiedad particular.

Es permitido a los disidentes fundar y sostener escuelas privadas para la enseñanza de sus propios hijos en la doctrina de sus religiones.

Chile, indeed, is making rapid progress towards a total repeal of Article 5 of the Constitution and the separation of Church and State. The following extract from the letter in the *Herald* of October 8, 1883, above quoted in these notes, briefly sketches some of the features of the "situation":

By virtue of the great power of his office President Santa Maria, even with the war raging, has had the boldness to defy and antagonize the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The breach between Rome and Chile, which began with the refusal of the Pope to confirm the Pinto Government's nomination of Don Francisco Paula Taforó to the Archbishopric of Santiago, and was intensified by Chile's refusal either to withdraw Taforó's name or to present any others for an alternative choice, reached a climax at the close of last year, when Santa Maria sent the

administration Chile associated her arms with those of Peru in war with Spain to combat the Spanish claim of revindication of political rights in the South American continent, and suffered the bombardment of Valparaiso as a penalty; that under President Errázuriz a transition of the tone of the Government from conservatism to liberalism, which had been going on for several years, was completed,\* the codification of the law was greatly advanced,† the rail-

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Pope's legate his passports. Mgr. del Frate left Chile overland, and when he reached the summit of the pass across the Andes he turned and cursed the Republic before he descended on the Argentine side. The response to the curse was the introduction of three bills into the Chilean Congress by the Santa Maria Government at the beginning of its session in June—a cemetery bill, a civil marriage bill and a civil registration bill. The first, which was enacted before the month was over, keeps all the graveyards in the Republic under the control of the Government and permits the burial of heretics in consecrated ground. The second, which has passed one House this month, and is sure to pass the other House, withdraws all the legal requirements of ecclesiastical ceremonies to the validity of marriage. The third will come in its turn and deprive the clergy of the exclusive authenticity of their records in matters pertaining to birth, marriage, death, inheritance, &c. A President who dares and does these things in a country whose constitution declares that "the religion of the Republic is the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman," found little or no difficulty in forcing his own way of dealing with the peace negotiations initiated with General Iglesias as the representative of Peru.

The passage of the civil marriage bill was finally effected, and President Santa Maria's signature was affixed to it, on January 10, 1884.

But in pursuance of the disposition of all countries of Latin civilization to swing to an extreme when they come into antagonism with the Roman Catholic Church (of which Mexico is an example), the Santa Maria Government, in its proceedings upon the cemetery bill, refused to accept an amendment (offered by Senator Don José Francisco Vergara) which would have been consonant with the true principles of religious liberty. This amendment proposed to put all churches or religious sects upon an equal footing, and endow them with authority to establish and maintain graveyards of their own, subject only (as here in the United States) to police regulations as regards the public health, &c.

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\* See *El Partido Liberal Democratico*, su orijen, sus propósitos, sus deberes, por B. Vicuña Mackenna (Santiago, 1876); also the *Historia de los Diez Años de la Administracion de Don Manuel Montt*, 5 vols. (Santiago, 1862), by the same author.

† The Civil Code of Chile was compiled by Don Andreas Bello. He was by birth a Venezuelan, a teacher of Simon Bolivar in his youth, and in his early manhood an associate with James Mill and a disciple of Jeremy Bentham

road system was extended south to the borders of the territory into which the remnant of the Araucanian Indians has been driven, telegraph wires were spread throughout Chile, communication with Europe by telegraph was attained by building a line across the Andes to connect with the cable from Brazil to Portugal, the constitution was amended to prevent the election of a President for a second successive term, and two powerful ironclads—named the *Cochrane* and the *Blanco Encalada*—were built in England for the Chilean navy, which have been essential implements in the victories over Peru.

In the same period the population increased from 1,083,801 by the census of 1843 to 1,439,120 by that of 1854; 1,819,222 by that of 1865, and 2,075,971 by that of 1875, and wealth increased in even greater proportion. Agriculture was stimulated. An important, though temporary, accession of riches came from grain exports to California and Australia in the early days of mining in those countries. The quantity of land brought under tillage was quadrupled, and vine-planting and wine-making were begun on a considerable scale. The wines of Chile, both white and red, are excellent. The copper mines were worked to such an extent that Chile became the chief copper-producing country in the world. Some of the silver mines rivalled the Comstock Lode in their yield.

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in London. At the age of 49 (in the year 1829) he became a resident in Chile. When the University of Chile was organized in 1843 he was its first Rector. He died at Santiago in 1865. A marble statue of him adorns the little plaza on the western front of the Palace of Congress. Although Bello is the most eminent South American publicist of this century, and won distinction not merely as a jurist but also as a poet, grammarian, educator and diplomatist, neither the American Cyclopædia, nor the Encyclopædia Britannica, nor Stoddart's Encyclopædia Americana allots any space for his biography.

The coal of Lota was proved of good enough quality for all purposes of manufactures and navigation. Nitrate fields in the north were opened and worked up to an export trade, and Chilean capital and Chilean labor were invested heavily in the richer nitrate fields and nitrate works of Bolivia and Peru. A Chilean steamship line, comprising several excellent Clyde-built vessels, was put into competition with the British Pacific Steam Navigation Company, which had monopolized the carrying trade along the coast.\* Valparaíso became a city of 75,000 inhabitants, and Santiago one of 175,000—about the size of Lima.† A great accession of commercial capital and mercantile residents from abroad was gained—chiefly English, but also largely German.

And it must be remarked that in all this our own country had little share.‡ The Chilean census of 1875 gives the number of resident North Americans in the whole country as only 931, and to day there is not a commercial firm in Valparaíso with exclusively North American partners.

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\* For a sketch of the foundation and development of this great British corporation see the *Chronological History of Steam Navigation*, by Rear-Admiral George Henry Preble of the U. S. Navy (Chicago, 1883). See also for more ample details, and for a sketch of efforts at competition, including the successful attempt of the South American (Chilean) Company, the *New York Herald* of December 26, 1883.

During the Autumn of 1883 a bill (introduced, I believe, by Senator Don Adolfo Ibañez) was defeated in the Chilean Congress, that proposed to limit the coasting trade of the Republic to Chilean vessels.

† The Chilean Bureau of Statistics estimates the present population of Santiago at 200,000, and that of Valparaíso at 95,000.

‡ At my suggestion, made to him personally at his home, Señor Vicuña Mackenna is now engaged upon a historical work recounting the share English-speaking people and their descendants have had in the settlement, independence, development and civilization of Chile—discriminating in it between subjects of Great Britain and citizens of the United States.

Citizens of the United States did, however, take an active part in the railroad building in Chile, and among the names honorably associated with it are those of two of our own townsmen, Mr. Walton W. Evans and Mr. Allan Campbell.

Banking also was an occupation which was greatly expanded, and many large fortunes were attained in it. Manufactures, however, save of those simple kinds which quickly arise in our own new settlements, such as flour-mills and tanneries, and mills for the rough fabrication of lumber, have not been established to any extent worth mention.\*

Altogether, at the beginning of the administration of President Pinto, in 1876, notwithstanding dependence on foreign sources for most manufactured goods, the progress of the country had been wonderful considering the shortness of its enjoyment of stable government. But in spite of President Montt's educational system, the census of 1875

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\* The following pamphlets in the English language abound in concise and valuable statistics concerning Chile, in a form convenient for persons whose investigations do not require reference to more minutely elaborated works :

Synopsis of Chilean Statistics for 1878-9 (Philadelphia, 1880).

Chile, by B. V. M. (Philadelphia, 1883).

The latter consists of an article compiled by Señor Vicuña Mackenna for an edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

Also see the following in Spanish :

Sinopsis Estadística y Jeográfica de Chile, 1882 (Santiago, 1883), issued from the Oficina Central de Estadística, by F. S. Asta-Buruaga, Jefe de la Oficina ; and the same for the year 1883 (Santiago, 1884).

Also the following works in French :

Le Chili tel qu'il est, publications officielles de la Commission Belge, faites avec l'approbation de la Commission directrice de l'Exposition Internationale du Chili de 1875, par Edouard Sève, Consul Général de Belgique au Chili, Président du Comité des Commissions Etrangères (Valparaiso, 1876).

Essai sur Chili, par Vicente Perez Rosales (Hamburg, 1857). A Spanish translation of this work, by M. Miquel, was published at Santiago in 1859

See also an *Ensayo Histórico sobre el Clima de Chile*, por B. Vicuña Mackenna (Valparaiso, 1877).

showed that out of the 2,075,971 inhabitants only 421,147 could read and write. Of this number 244,985 were males ; and as the laws require a registration, and restrict voting to males, who must be 25 years old if unmarried, and 21 if married,\* and be able to read and write, and must also possess some property qualification or exercise a trade or a profession yielding an equivalent income, the privilege of voting was confined to an aristocracy. In fact, the total of the votes cast for Presidential electors in 1876 was only 46,114 (an aggregate not much greater than that in some single Congressional districts in the United States), and the voting constituency of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies was no larger. In short, the Government of Chile was securely vested in an oligarchy small in comparison with almost any other country in the world where there is a theory of popular suffrage ; and this oligarchy was fortified by the circumstance that Chile is not a federal union of States on the model of our country and Mexico, but is a highly centralized republic, with a civil service system of promotions and pensions akin to those in the military and naval service, with power vested in the President to appoint

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\* As bearing on the question of marriage, it is pertinent to remark that the same census showed that the number of married men was only 278,013 out of a total male population of 1,033,974, and that nearly one-fourth of the births were out of wedlock. The precise figures are: Total number of births, 90,371, of which 68,616 were legitimate and 21,755 illegitimate. How monstrous this proportion is in comparison with European and North American countries may be inferred by observation of the following table of "percentages of illegitimate births," which is given in M. G. Mulhall's Dictionary of Statistics (London, 1884), p. 239:

England.....	4.5	Austria.....	12.9	Denmark.....	11.2
Scotland.....	8.9	Italy.....	6.8	Sweden.....	10.2
Ireland.....	2.3	Switzerland.....	4.6	Norway.....	8.5
France.....	7.2	Spain and Portugal...	5.5	Greece.....	1.6
Germany.....	8.4	Belgium.....	7.0	United States.....	7.0
Russia.....	3.1	Holland.....	3.5	Canada.....	5.0



the intendentes of the provinces and governors of the departments, and all the high judiciary, and to nominate the high ecclesiastical functionaries also, so that the whole official body, save the legislative houses, is an emanation of his will, with even municipal expenditures subjected to his discretion, and with a prejudice against the rise of new men into the upper ranks of the aristocracy like that which used to prevail in our Slave States.\*

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\* Of this there is a conspicuous instance in Don Eulogio Altamirano, repeatedly Minister in the Cabinets of Presidents Perez and Errázuriz and at present Intendente of Valparaiso, who is generally esteemed the second officer in the Republic in official importance. Señor Altamirano was the chief of the Chilean plenipotentiaries at the Arica Conference.

Another is the instance of Don Patricio Lynch, now Vice-Admiral (chief officer) of the Chilean navy, and just recalled to Santiago to take the portfolio of the Ministry of War, after serving as General-in-Chief of the Army in occupation of Peru during the last three years. Admiral Lynch's name even does not appear in J. D. Cortes' *Diccionario Biográfico Americano*, published in Paris so lately as 1875, although he had served in the Chilean navy with distinguished merit more than thirty years. At the beginning of the war with Peru in 1879 he was assigned to commands of inconsiderable importance. His excellence as sailor, soldier and administrator forced itself at last into recognition only by the need the country soon found for its best talent in the most responsible places.

A classified register of the Government from the foundation of the Republic would show at a glance, by its repetition of names, the monopoly of office by families, and if anybody should investigate the connection of these families with one another, by marriage and other ties, with the learning, patience and skill which Mr. Francis Galton has displayed in his treatises on hereditary genius, some very remarkable statistics might be collated.

As to my suggestion of resemblances between the social and political organization of Chile and that formerly existing in our own Slave States, see the following extract from a letter written to the late Senator Charles Sumner by Don Domingo F. Sarmiento, at the time Minister of the Argentine Republic at Washington and since President of that Republic :

The greatest antagonism between the Southern States and the Northern (*i. e.*, in the United States) has come, in my judgment, from the Southern following the same plan as that of ancient society in Europe and South America, and the Northern advancing in new and peculiar paths.

See Appendix to *Life in the Argentine Republic, or Civilization and Barbarism*, from the Spanish of D. F. Sarmiento (New York, 1868).

History does not furnish an example of a more powerful political "machine" under the title of a republic; nor, I am bound to say, one which has been more ably directed so far as concerns the aggrandizement of the country, or more honestly administered so far as concerns pecuniary corruption.\*

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\* It is noteworthy that the Chilean press, which is more ably and independently conducted than that of any other South American country with the possible exception of the Argentine Republic, does not exercise a powerful influence adverse to this oligarchical control of politics. There are in Chile (according to a list published by *La Patria*, of Valparaiso, which I have taken the trouble to analyze) no less than 121 newspapers, of which 29 are dailies. Some of these, as, for examples, the *Mercurio*, of Valparaiso, and the *Ferrocarril* and *Epoca*, of Santiago, are of remarkable merit by the standard of the journalism of Latin countries. The proportion of them which is contemptibly subservient to political parties or faction leaders is somewhat smaller, I believe, than the proportion in the press of the United States. Yet this Chilean press, so formidable if it should please to agitate for democratizing the politics of the country, exercises little or no effort in that direction. It is intensely patriotic, and is intensely satisfied with the oligarchical system. I regard its complacency as a very strong piece of evidence that the present method of Chilean government is in harmony with the genius of the country, that is, the genius of the Latin races. The democratic spirit of Teutonic civilization, which can be distinctly traced from the ancient German forests down to its prodigious modern display in the United States, is less active in Chile than even in Spain; and whatever Teutonic component has entered into the Chilean population has either been assimilated by the predominant Latin rudiments or is so absolutely devoted to money-making that it is not felt as a distinct political force. See on this subject the following extract from a letter in the New York *Herald* of October 8, 1883:

A considerable strain from England, of half a century or more ago, enters into the composition of the small ruling class in Chile. But this British element is perfectly amalgamated, and has become even more intensely Chilean than the Spanish element itself. In the south of Chile, at and about Valdivia, there is a colony of several thousand Germans, but it has scarcely any influence as yet upon the political character of the country. Its members are thrifty farmers, skilful brewers of beer and tanners of excellent leather. Nor does the numerous and wealthy colony of foreign merchants in Valparaiso count, in its influence upon that character, for more than the mercantile community of Hamburg does upon the Court and Cabinet at Berlin. To understand Chile as a political power it is needful to study it at Santiago, where two-thirds of the ruling families have palaces which they inhabit during the Southern winter, spending the summer, after the adjournment of Congress, either on great estates in the country or in villas at Viña del Mar. Possessing wealth which makes it independent of toil for livelihood, this ruling class pursues

At the beginning of the year 1879 (in the middle of President Pinto's term) Chile possessed 1,010 miles of railroad, private and public, and 15,370 miles of carriage road.\* Her exports had mounted from \$12,138,000 in 1853 (before the State railroad system was begun) to \$31,695,039 in 1878.

politics as a profession. In every sense it is an aristocracy. It does not comprehend the practicability of a control of government by public opinion. There is no public opinion in Chile (unless it be on religious topics) except such as it dictates. With a few remarkable exceptions (among which I would name conspicuously the instances of Don Adolfo Ibañez and Don Francisco Asta-Bur-uaga, both of whom have served as Ministers at Washington; Don Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, who was the Chilean agent in North America during the Spanish war, and Don Jorje Huneeus, the rector of the university and President of the Chamber of Deputies—his the most remarkable of all, inasmuch as he never has set foot outside his country) it does not understand the political system of the United States. As for the society of the United States, it is known in Santiago only by such examples of our people as reside there—a few missionaries and school teachers, half a dozen dentists and photographers, all worthy persons, but not completely representative of our country. There is one other variety of our people sometimes seen, by reason of the fact that we have no extradition treaty with Chile; and if to this catalogue I add the occasional visits of naval officers on a week's leave from their ships, and the regular presence of such diplomatists as our Government has been pleased to appoint, I exhaust all the sources of information the ruling class at Santiago has of our society except from books. Its own members do not travel in the United States, nor even in England or Germany. They frequent Latin countries—France and Italy. English, so commonly heard in Valparaiso, is little heard in the capital. The only member of the present Cabinet who is acquainted with the language is Señor Aldunate, and he speaks it seldom, though he understands it perfectly.

The most comprehensive and generous appreciation of the social traits of our country which I have known to be formally expressed by any Chilean is to be found in a paper entitled "Life in the United States," which was read by Don Adolfo Ibañez in the Academy of Belles Lettres at Santiago on May 20, 1880, and printed in the *Ferrocarril* newspaper in that city on May 27. Señor Ibañez (born at Santiago in 1829) achieved a commanding professional position at the bar early in life. Before his diplomatic service at Washington he had been the Chilean envoy to Peru in some of the most intricate and difficult negotiations in which the two republics ever were entangled (growing out of their alliance in war against Spain) and also had been Minister of Foreign Relations in the Cabinet of President Errázuriz. At present he is Vice-President of the Chilean Senate.

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\* What this signifies in South America with regard to power and prosperity is evident by these mere figures to every traveller in that continent. Compare Chile with Ecuador, for example. With regard to internal communications in Ecuador see Mr. G. E. Church's report to the State Department at Washington in 1881, Senate Ex. Doc. No. 69, 47th Congress, 2d session, p. 48.

But she was feeling the depression in business pursuits which began in 1873 to affect all the world. She had contracted a great foreign debt, mainly for railroad building, and although the roads were judiciously planned and well worth their cost, and were enhancing mining and agricultural property at an unprecedented rate, yet a decline in the price of copper, the chief mineral export, and short crops for several seasons—particularly in 1876 and 1877—combined with the world-wide stagnation of business to embarrass the Republic. Its financial credit was in danger of rapid impairment by failure of means to keep up a sinking fund for the foreign debt. The accounts of the treasury had for several years shown a deficit, which was increasing. The public income from all ordinary sources for 1878 was only \$14,031,687, while the outgo (including a deficit from 1877) was \$21,375,729.\* There was in September, 1878, a domestic debt of \$16,916,022, bearing interest of from 3 to 8 per cent., and a foreign debt of \$46,481,000, bearing interest of from 5 to 7 per cent., all of it negotiated below par, and some of it so low as 83 cents on the dollar. The total amount of the foreign trade was less than \$60,000,000, and although the exports showed an excess over the imports, it was in diminished proportion from former years.

A political cloud also was darkening again in the north, in the renewal of something like a confederation between Peru and Bolivia.

I might prolong a narrative of this “impending crisis,” but the limits of my occasion will not permit more illustrations of its urgency. The peril was grave, and so needed to be the remedy. Under the lead of the bold oligarchy which

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\* See Synopsis of Chilean Statistics for 1878-9 (Philadelphia, 1880), pp. 15, 16.

governs Chile, it suddenly took the shape of war—and of war waged, as every step in its diplomatic history shows, with intention from the first (although at the first this intention was disclaimed) that if successful it should reinforce the exchequer by conquest and annexation of the nitrate-bearing provinces of Bolivia and Peru.

Since this war has proved so successful for Chile, it has become a usage among her adversaries to ascribe to her long and mature preparations for it. This is not true. It was a sudden resolution. The fact that only two years before it broke out a bill to sell the two ironclads was passed by the Chamber of Deputies proves its suddenness. So does the reduction of the national guard, or militia, which the stringency of the finances had compelled. So do the facts that there was no sufficient store of munitions for a grand campaign (though I know that the Ministry asserted the contrary to Congress), and that the bottoms of the ironclads were so foul that their speed was reduced nearly one-third from its normal rate.\* War of course was a con-

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\* The relative military force of the belligerents at the start throws some light also on the subject.

Mr. Markham, in his history of the war, published in 1883, (hereafter to be mentioned) states "the Peruvian army" in 1879 as "only 4,500" strong, and that in "nominal numbers;" besides "5,400 gendarmerie." But in his historical sketch of Peru, published in 1880, he had stated it as consisting in 1878 "of eight battalions of infantry raised by conscription, 5,600 men; of 1,200 cavalry in three regiments; of two brigades of artillery, 1,000 men; and of 5,400 gendarmerie; altogether 13,200 men"

Lieutenant Mason, in his impartial official monograph (also hereafter to be mentioned), says that the "standing army of Peru," at the beginning of the war, "including the gendarmerie and Lima police, has been variously estimated at from 9,000 to 13,000 men, of all arms;" that "according to apparently reliable sources the Bolivian regular army numbered 2,300 men and 1,000 officers," and that "the Chilean regular army had never exceeded 3,500 men of all arms," and "in 1879 it numbered 1,500 infantry, 410 artillery and 530 cavalry—total, 2,440;" but that "besides the regulars each city had a uniformed body of militia, that of Valparaiso forming a brigade of infantry which would have compared very favorably with like troops in our own country."

tingency always more or less under contemplation by both Chile and Peru, but on neither side were there sufficient preparations for this war to warrant one country in accusing the other of long premeditation. Indeed the quotations of Chilean and Peruvian bonds in London show that Chile was deemed there to have taken an injudicious step. I had the curiosity to examine them to-day, and found that the first effect of the news of war was to considerably depress Chilean credit and to slightly raise that of Peru.

The Chilean statesmen ran a great risk.\* But if war be considered merely as a game for a prize, and its horrors and infamies be left out of consideration, it was a prize well worth playing for.

## II.

The nitrate-bearing provinces of Bolivia and Peru lie directly above the Chilean nitrate and silver-bearing province of Atacama, in that dry strip, between the Andes and the ocean, which begins not far north of the Chilean port of Coquimbo, and runs almost 2,000 miles by the coast line to a point between the Peruvian ports of Payta and Tumbes. Upon this long strip a heavy rain never falls, and often years pass without a shower.† The coast line of the nitrate district is some 400 miles long, including about 200 miles in

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\* If the Peruvian Admiral Grau, with the ironclad *Huascar*, on August 27, 28, 1879, had destroyed the water-tanks at Antofagasta, where the main body of the Chilean army was concentrated (as he might have done if his standard of military morality had been different), the fortunes of the whole war might have been changed.

† For some discussion of the causes of this phenomenon (aside from more technical explanations in scientific works on meteorology and physical geography), see Hutchinson's *Two Years in Peru* (London, 1873), vol. 1, pp. 48-51.

Chile and the Bolivian littoral, and more than 200 miles in Peru. The Peruvian part of it is the richest in the deposits and the most advanced in their development.

There is no vegetation along the nitrate coast. Barren, sandy cliffs rise out of the ocean to a height of from 500 to 2,000 feet. At their base in some places there are lowlands varying from a few hundred to a few thousand feet wide, and on a few of these towns are built, as, for examples, Antofagasta in Bolivia and Iquique and Pisagua in Peru. The fresh water for all purposes—domestic and manufacturing—is distilled from the sea or brought up or down the coast on shipboard. At a short distance back from the cliffs there are hills, and then across to the Andes, from 50 to 80 miles, stretches a sterile plain, at an elevation of several thousand feet, and beneath its surface lies the mineral treasure in layers, below a sheet of impacted stones, gravel and sand, several feet thick. Railroads scale the cliffs from the ports I have mentioned and from others, and run into this plain, some of them back to copper and silver mines in the Andes. Scores of nitrate works are situated along these roads, and there are also great factories in the ports to which much of the crude substance is brought down by rail for extraction of its riches.

The money value of this region, so desolate to the eye, is incalculable. The world derives here almost its whole supply of nitrates and of iodine, and the abundance and richness of the metals in the mountains that bound it on the east grow more wonderful with every year's research. There are also great deposits of guano in the highlands bordering the sea. You may remember, in the debates, last year and the year before, in Congress and the press, concerning Cochet and Landreau claims and *Crédit Industriel*

and Peruvian Company scandals, the amazing figures which cropped out in letters and reports and were so little comprehended by the public that their magnitude provoked derision. I have in this portfolio a copy of an unpublished official memorandum made in 1882 by Señor García Calderón, the prisoner-President of Peru, in which he estimates the value of the nitrate properties in the Peruvian province of Tarapacá alone as capable of being capitalized, for the purpose of government taxation, at the sum of six hundred million dollars, and I believe that this is an underestimate.\*

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\* The following is an extract from the memorandum mentioned, as regards the nitrates of this province, without reference to its other sources of wealth :

According to the strictest and severest calculations made by engineers of Europe and America, the province of Tarapacá will support the extraction of saltpetre for more than a century with an annual removal of seven and a half to eight million quintals. Since this exportation, either through a government monopoly, or, as now, by an export tax, could give yearly \$5,000,000, it is evident that the province is worth \$300,000,000. Consequently though Chile (acquiring a cession of this province as a condition of peace) should (as a consequence of obligations accompanying the cession of it) pay \$300,000,000 to liquidate the Peruvian debt, she still would have left \$300,000,000 as her war indemnity, besides all that she has so far received and besides the revenues which the custom-houses of Iquique, Pisagua, &c., give for importations, which may be calculated at several millions yearly. It must also be remembered that although the debts of Peru amount to more than \$300,000,000 Chile would not be obliged to pay them in full, for she could make with the creditors advantageous arrangements (as Peru had done) which would reduce those debts to (more or less) the half of their amount. So that the province of Tarapacá, in reality, is worth more than \$400,000,000 to Chile, and this is what she would receive as war indemnity by its cession alone. But to these economic advantages should be added in the calculation the other advantages which would result to Chile from increase of territory and advancement of power and from the universal monopoly of saltpetre which the Peruvian Government had projected and was prevented by the war from securing and which Chile would easily realize, holding Antofagasta as well as Tarapacá and thus being the absolute proprietor of all the nitrates so necessary in Europe for industries and for manure in agriculture. And when the guano is exhausted which to-day competes with the nitrates for agriculture, it does not seem to me venturesome to suppose that the saltpetre may then sell at an advance of some fifty per cent. above its price at the present time, and consequently the gain of Chile in the possession of Tarapacá would be so much the greater.

What solid foundation there was for this argument of Señor Calderón is attested by the most recent Chilean statistics of the exports of nitrates from the five chief nitrate ports. Of these only the port of Taltal was a Chilean possession before 1879; Antofagasta and Tocopilla were Bolivian ports, and Iquique and Pisagua Peruvian. From the *Estadística Comercial de la República de*



For this source of revenue the Chilean statesmen, in their pecuniary embarrassment, resolved, as I have said, to make a sudden stroke at a great risk. But before we consider what they did and how they did it, it is needful to give some attention to the condition of Peru.

### III.

By reason of being the nucleus of Spanish administration in South America the Viceroyalty of Peru was not only saturated with the vices but also adorned with the elegancies of Spanish colonization more than any other part of the continent. The Incas and other Indians were harder worked and heavier taxed than anywhere else. It is estimated that between the time of the conquest and the time of Peruvian independence more than eight millions of them perished in compulsory labor in the mines. The pride of the white race and its contempt for manual toil were intense. The trappery of official station was gaudy, and its emoluments were great. The traits of Spanish character caught from long contact with Islam were brought out upon this field of action more prominently than they were displayed at home—especially an Oriental indifference to human suffering ; and to this was added, what is not Oriental, but probably comes into Span-

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Chile, correspondiente al Año de 1882 (Valparaiso, 1883), p. xlvii., I compile the following table :

#### ESPORTACION DE SALITRE EN EL AÑO DE 1882.

<i>Puertos.</i>	<i>Kilogramos.</i>	<i>Valores.</i>
Taltal. ....	41,804,122	\$2,508,247
Antofagasta. ....	53,479,189	3,530,626
Tocopilla. ....	10,188,751	701,500
Iquique. ....	271,114,898	15,186,943
Pisagua. ....	112,759,585	6,771,948

ish character from Roman descent, insensibility to the suffering of dumb animals and delight in sports culminating in their murder. The bull-ring of Lima is the largest in the world, and many of its exhibitions are under the patronage of the Church.

In relative justice to the Peruvian whites and half-castes, however, I ought to add that I do not think that they are any more cruel than the Chileans. Bull-rings and cock-pits, to be sure, are prohibited in Chile, but by the enlightened will of the Government, not by the humane desire of the people. The first intense ambition of a Chilean boy in the common walks of life is to own a *corvo*, or curved knife, and it becomes his inseparable companion through manhood. The statistics of the losses in the battlefields of the present war tell the story. The proportion of the dead to the wounded in many of them has been more than two to one, by butchery after victory.

But to return to Peru—the fact that Lima was the chief seat of Spanish power and luxury resulted in a great accomplishment of the higher classes of colonial society at a very early day.\* Lima was founded in 1535, by Francisco Pizarro, who could neither write nor read ; but not a score of years passed before there was a demand for facilities for liberal education there. The University of San Marcos was the first in the New World. Its charter bears the sign manual of the great Emperor Charles V. in 1551, only ten years after Pizarro was assassinated—almost sixty years

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\* See, for the municipal and social history of the Peruvian capital, *Estadística General de Lima*, por Manuel A. Fuentes (2d ed. Paris, 1866), and *Lima, esquisses historiques, statistiques, administratives, commerciales et morales* (Paris, 1867) by the same author.

before Hendrick Hudson landed on Sandy Hook.\* Santiago, founded in 1541 by Pedro de Valdivia, whose humble house—or one pointed out as such—still stands near the foot of the hill of Santa Lucia,† was then but a frontier post. He and his followers for many a year afterward were struggling too desperately for very life against the Araucanians to give much thought to facilities for intellectual culture.‡ Differences traceable to these early conditions persist to the present day. Lima was the Athens of Spanish America; Santiago became its Sparta. The sole particular in which the triumphant Chileans now are willing to concede superiority to the Peruvians is significant. They acknowledge that the Castilian tongue is spoken in Peru with a near approach to purity, while their own speech is rude. Another consequence

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\* In 1571 Pope Pius V. endowed it with special privileges, so that thenceforth it was styled a “Pontifical” as well as a “Royal” institution of learning. But by a royal decree of King Philip II., in the same year, the university was secularized. With regard to ecclesiastical in distinction from secular application and control of institutions of learning, see the following extract from Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, b. v., c. 1 :

The present universities of Europe were originally, the greater part of them, ecclesiastical corporations, instituted for the education of churchmen. They were founded by authority of the Pope, and were so entirely under his immediate protection, that their members, whether masters or students, had all of them what was then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were exempted from the civil jurisdiction of the countries in which their respective universities were situated and were amenable only to the ecclesiastical tribunals. What was taught in the greater part of those universities was suitable to the end of their institution—either theology, or something that was merely preparatory to theology.

† See the *Guia Popular del Santa Lucia* (Santiago, 1874) for a description of the laying out of this rocky, volcanic hill in the heart of the city, in 1872–4, as a public park, which is unique among pleasure-grounds anywhere in the world and unsurpassed in the beauty of the prospect its visitor commands around the whole horizon, including in the east the main cordillera of the Andes. In consideration of the wrecking of the public pleasure-grounds of Lima by the Chileans, it should be the occasion of some shame to them to remember that one of the most liberal private subscribers toward the adornment of Santa Lucia was General Prado, of Peru, at the time an exile from his country.

‡ To this remark, however, the famous epic, *La Araucaña*, of Don Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, demands an exception in behalf of that soldier-poet.

which subsists is the superior importance of women in Peru in the relations of society to politics. In Chile the women are not a potent force in the State, save through domestic teasing about religious legislation. Still another is that Peru is more priest-ridden than Chile; but there is a counteracting feature of the relative influence of the clergy in the two countries in the circumstance that in Chile its intelligence, morality and social connections are generally of a higher grade.\*

By the independence of Peru none of the vices of Spanish sway were eradicated. The Government during all the sixty years since the battle of Ayacucho has been exercised by an oligarchy, but unlike Chile this oligarchy has not been an aristocracy. The higher Peruvian society has sought to live in official station as before, but the lower grades also, and often the very lowest, have forced themselves into the official circles by military turbulence. "If you ask me to describe my country's system of government in a single phrase," wrote an eminent Peruvian to me a few days ago, "I should call it a well established system of government by revolution." We have seen how little suffrage amounts to in Chile. In Peru it never has amounted to anything. Military chieftains have wrestled for power, and ousted one another by force. Often an Indian soldier has been installed in the palace of Pizarro; and I am not aware that the Indian Presidents of Peru have been worse

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\*In the war now drawing to a close the Peruvian soldiers fought under the supposed patronage of the Virgin of Merced and the Chileans under that of the Virgin of Carmen; just as in the recent combat between republicans and imperialists in Mexico, the soldiers of Juarez assumed that the Virgin of Guadalupe was their patron, and those of Maximilian looked for patronage to the Virgin de Los Remedios, whose chapel surmounts the platform of the pyramid of Cholula.

than those of white descent. On the contrary, one of them, General Ramon Castilla, ranks among the least intolerable rulers the country has had. The clerical influence has played an important part in the revolutions, and seldom a beneficent one. Its alliances, as in the case of the Dictator Pierola, generally have been with the favorites of the ignorant populace.\*

It is almost superfluous to add, after these remarks, that the building of a commonwealth upon solid foundations of order and credit seldom was the aim of any recent ruler of Peru. Interest soon ceased to be paid on the public debt contracted in the war of independence, and was not renewed till Castilla's time, after the value of the guano deposits began to be ascertained. The importance of these deposits, although it was pointed out by Humboldt near the beginning of the century, was not understood in Peru till about forty years ago. Within twenty-five years afterward more than \$500,000,000 worth of guano was scraped off the Chincha Islands alone. I am not

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\* Pierola's first official proceeding upon his elevation to the Dictatorship, on December 23, 1879, before even addressing his request to the representatives of foreign powers in Lima for a recognition of his authority, was to send a communication to the Pope, soliciting his blessing. In Minister Christiancy's despatch of January 7, 1880, to the State Department at Washington, he significantly refers to religious influences as those "which brought about the dictatorship."

The clause of the Peruvian Constitution of 1856 concerning religion differs somewhat in its language from Art. 5 of the Chilean constitution. It is contained in Art. 4, and reads as follows :

La Nacion profesa la Religion Católica, Apostólica, Romana : el Estado la protege y no permite el ejercicio público de otra alguna.

No attempt ever has been made to construe away this prohibition of the public exercise of other religions, as was done in Chile in 1865, and the difference in language would be fatal to such an undertaking. I found last year in Lima that Protestant worship was practiced there. But the services were held in a private house.

one of those theorists who believe that poverty is a better school for character than riches. On the contrary I have known many an instance in which adversity has debased while prosperity has improved a character. But the sudden efflux of riches from this manure did not improve Peru. It inoculated the official circles with more corruption, and the country with more turbulence, and led Peru into venal extravagances which culminated in the time of President Colonel Don José Balta (1868-1872), when two foreign loans were negotiated which it is Chile's intention to leave as millstones around the necks of the Peruvians after depriving them of the resources on the pledge of which the money was obtained. The first loan, of nearly \$60,000,000, bearing six per cent. interest, was placed in England, France, Belgium and Holland mainly, in 1870, at 82½ cents on the dollar; the second loan, of more than \$180,000,000, bearing five per cent. interest, and designed in part to take up the former one, was negotiated in 1872, at 72 cents on the dollar, in the same countries. All the revenues of Peru, from whatsoever source—customs, nitrates, guano or whatever else—were generally pledged for security, and all deposits of guano already known or yet to be discovered were specially mortgaged.

Railroad building was prosecuted on a gigantic scale with part of the proceeds of these loans, our own countryman, Mr. Henry Meiggs, who had finished the railroad from Valparaiso to Santiago in Chile, and moved up to Peru, becoming the chief contractor. His greatest work was the Oroya road, designed to connect the Pacific with the Amazon and to make an outlet for the rich ores of Cerro de Pasco on the way. Beginning at Callao and running through Lima, the rails are laid 86 miles up to Chicla,

12,220 feet above the sea level, and there the work remains suspended. It was meant to pierce the crest of the Andes by a tunnel at an elevation of 15,722 feet, and the grading is done to that height. Two ironclads, one built in England in 1865, and the other, also English-built in 1866, had been bought during the war with Spain which began in 1864; and in 1869 two monitors were bought in the United States and named the *Atahualpa* and the *Manco Capac*. An army excessively disproportioned to the population and needs of the country was kept on foot. Everybody aspired to live in government employment, or on a sinecure or a pension. All the features of society which were reckless of the future were monstrously aggravated. The abstinence of the natives from mercantile pursuits and their surrender of the traffic of Lima into the hands of foreigners became complete. The Peruvian gentlemen followed no occupation except officeholding or the administration of great landed estates, and the landed proprietors seldom exercised proper personal supervision of their haciendas. Chinese labor was imported, and the coolies were worked cruelly, as the negro slaves had been before them. Nor was the intellectual refinement which distinguished the upper classes of society a barrier to the progress of the corruption. The finest intellects in Peru—the keenest lawyers and publicists—with few honorable exceptions, became partners of the corruptionists or hired themselves to their service. Purity was narrowed, for its haunts of refuge, to religious and domestic asylums, and too many of these were tainted in the general debasement. Veracity in thought and speech—never the strongest characteristic of Spanish-American peoples—became almost extinct.

In the midst of this splendid demoralization President

Balta was assassinated in July, 1872, and after a brief period of terrible disorder there came the first civilian President of Peru, Don Manuel Pardo, who, if he had lived to this day, might have piloted his country away from the Devil's Bridge reefs toward which it was so rapidly steaming. But in 1878, a year after the close of his presidency, he was assassinated by a soldier in the courtyard of the Senate, of which he had become a member and was the presiding officer. Pardo struggled with the public debt as best he could by cutting down domestic extravagance, but the revenues for 1872, exclusive of those from the hypothecated guano, were only some \$14,000,000, while the estimates for ordinary expenses, exclusive of the service of the debt, were nearly twice as much, and in the general estimates for that year the cost of that service (including interest and sinking fund) was given as \$30,729,058. The public finances were further embarrassed by vicious guano contracts made with foreigners. It was inevitable that the interest and the sinking fund should soon be suspended. They were suspended on the 1st of January, 1876, and have never been resumed; nor have the foreign creditors of Peru ever been able to get any of their mortgage rights save by an imperfect and temporary arrangement with Chile touching conquered territory, out of which Chile has taken a lion's share of the profit. To aggravate the distressful condition of Peru, Pardo was assailed by a rebellion got up by Don Nicolas Pierola, of whom we shall hear more in the progress of this narrative; but this time fortunately Pierola did not succeed, though he crippled his country in a way that in his most evil imaginations he could not have foreseen, by compelling



Pardo to expend in suppressing the rebellion a sum which he had intended to apply to enlarge and strengthen the Peruvian navy.

The chief financial expedient to which President Pardo resorted was an attempt to make the nitrates a Government monopoly as the guano was. (I have not time to go into the details.) He framed plans for the acquisition or control of all the nitrate works of the province of Tarapacá by the Government, so that by virtue of the monopoly it should regulate the price of nitrates in all the markets of the world and take profit accordingly.\* He also negotiated with President Don Adolfo Ballivian, of Bolivia, the secret treaty of alliance in 1873, which I have mentioned in speaking of Chile.

The nitrate policy of Pardo was carried out under his successor (who had been Balta's predecessor) General Don Mariano Ignacio Prado, who suppressed another rebellion of Pierola in 1877, and was President at the time to which we now have conducted down both Peru and Chile—the beginning of 1879. Both countries at this time were in pecuniary trouble—but that of Peru antedated its neighbor's and had become chronic. The Chilean five per cents. were quoted in the London market on January 2, 1879, at 66¼; the Peruvian five per cents. at only 11½.

## I. V

Of the condition of Bolivia my limits do not allow me to speak, although I fear that popular knowledge about that country in the United States consists of little more than

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\* For convenient reference, in an English translation, to the earliest laws passed on this subject, see T. J. Hutchinson's *Two Years in Peru* (London, 1873), vol. 1, pp. 56-61.

legends of the silver mines of Potosi, and the mistake which was current some years ago, that the great Andean peak of Sorata is the highest in this hemisphere.\* The population of Bolivia is not definitely known. It may be anywhere from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000, of whom Indians without any mixture of white blood are seven or eight-tenths.† Nor are its boundaries clearly defined. It is the most elevated country in the world except Thibét. The present seat of its government is at La Paz, a city of nearly a hundred thousand inhabitants, which was founded by the Spaniard Alonzo de Mendoza in 1548, thirteen years after Pizarro founded Lima, seven years after Valdivia founded Santiago. In 1879 Bolivia bordered upon the Pacific Ocean only by that little patch of desert between the Peruvian province of Tarapacá and the Chilean province of Atacama, which I have mentioned in describing the nitrate belt of the dry strip of the South American coast. Antofagasta is the principal port in it. Bolivia is also connected with the coast by one of the Peruvian railways; which runs from Lake Titicaca—the sacred lake of the Incas—down through the city of Arequipa to the port of Mollendo. But

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\* That honor is now ascribed with certainty to the Chilean volcanic peak of Aconcagua, which is visible from the bay of Valparaiso at a distance of more than a hundred miles. English measurements assign 23,920 feet as the height of this peak, and locate it in latitude  $32^{\circ}38'$ . But the official Chilean statistics (*Sinopsis Jeográfica de Chile en 1883*, p. 4) state its height as 6,835 metres (that is, 22,424 feet) and the latitude as  $32^{\circ}40'$ .

† A letter which I have received by the last South Pacific mail from one of the best-informed publicists in South America, dated at La Paz only last month, contains the following brief statement concerning Bolivia:

Bear in mind that of the 1,800,000 people of this country about one per cent. only have the right to vote, fully seventy-five per cent. (if not more) are Indians, ten per cent. (or more) are Cholos, and the remainder perhaps may be classified as whites. This is a very liberal calculation, however, of the proportion of whites. There is good authority for saying, if you please, that the Bolivians who fairly may be called whites do not amount to ten per cent. of the population.

its easiest connection with a Pacific port is over mule paths and cart roads to Tacna, and thence by a short railroad (only some forty miles) to the Peruvian port of Arica, and this is the route which most of the foreign trade of Bolivia has followed. The Tacna & Arica railroad was one of the earliest in South America and was finished in 1854.

Bolivia's chief boundary dispute was with Chile, and was of long continuance. When the South American republics were constituted they by common consent adopted actual possession as it was in 1810 for the definition of their boundaries by the doctrine of *uti possidetis, ita possidetis*—a phrase which will become familiar to our ears if the project initiated by Henry Clay and resuscitated by Mr. Blaine ever is carried out—of a political congress of all American nations to settle their disputes peaceably under the auspices of the United States. But apart from perplexities arising from three different Spanish jurisdictions—the political, the military and the ecclesiastical—whose territorial limits even on paper were not always identical, the naked question of fact as to actual possession was and is in dispute in a multitude of instances. The quarrel between Bolivia and Chile was one of the most notable of the number, and involved the title to the coast district between the latitudes of 23° and 25°. Without going into details, it was adjusted by a treaty in 1874, by which Chile's pretensions to territorial rights that would have included the port of Antofagasta were withdrawn and Bolivia entered into a stipulation about laying taxes there. Chile deemed this stipulation broken by a Bolivian law passed in February, 1878, laying a tax on exports of nitrates from that port. The proprietors of the nitrate works—a Chilean company working with English capital—refused payment,

and at the beginning of 1879 their works were advertised for sale for the arrears, and it was suspected that there was an understanding between Bolivia and Peru that they should be bid in to further the policy of a Peruvian nitrate monopoly, which has been explained.

Here was a ready-made pretext for war, if Chile wanted war ; and, as I have said, the war was begun by the occupation of Antofagasta by Chilean troops on the day fixed for the auction, February 14, 1879, five years ago last Thursday.

The Bolivians resisted vainly, with some loss of life. In a few days the Chilean occupation was extended to the whole of the Bolivian littoral ; and Bolivia responded with a declaration of war against Chile, which was dated the 1st of March. Then Peru came in with a proposal of mediation ; and her special envoy to Santiago, Señor Don José Antonio Lavalle, was confronted with evidence of the secret treaty of 1873 between Bolivia and Peru ; and Chile then, having understood of course from the first that if she undertook hostilities against the one she must assume them against the other, sent Señor Lavalle his passports on April 2 and formally declared war against Peru on April 5.\*

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\* The secret treaty of 1873 between Bolivia and Peru did not by its terms compel either republic to make common cause with the other, but left it to the discretion of each to declare whether or not it would recognize a *casus federis*. This is clear by its first three articles :

ART. I. The contracting parties will unite and join to mutually guarantee their independence, sovereignty, and the integrity of their respective territory, binding themselves by the terms of the present treaty to defend themselves against all foreign aggressions, whether proceeding from another independent state, or from a force without a flag, owing obedience to no recognized power.

ART. II. The alliance will become effective to protect the rights expressed in the preceding article and particularly in cases of offense consisting :

1st. In acts tending to deprive either of the contracting parties of a portion of their territory, in order to assume dominion over it or to yield it to another power.

V.

This is a pertinent place to comment for a moment on the treatises concerning this war which are accessible for information of its motives and progress. Besides official documents,\* there are a multitude of pamphlets, in various

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2d. In acts tending to oblige either of the contracting parties to submit to a protectorate, sale or cession of territory, or to establish over it any superiority, right, or preëminence whatsoever, which may injure or offend the full and ample exercise of its sovereignty and independence.

3d. In acts tending to do away with or change the form of government, the political constitution or the laws that the contracting parties have made, or may in future make, in the exercise of the sovereignty.

ART. III. As both the contracting parties admit that every legitimate act of alliance is based upon justice, for each of them respectively the right is established of deciding whether the offense inferred to the other is comprised amongst those mentioned in the preceding article.

On April 5, when Chile formally declared war, Peru had not formally recognized a *casus fœderis* with Bolivia under the treaty. The press and populace of Lima, however, had been clamoring for hostilities for several weeks. The *casus fœderis* under the first clause of Art. II., by reason of the Chilean occupation of the Bolivian littoral, was formally recognized in a proclamation issued by President Prado at Lima under date of April 6.

On February 19, Mr. Richard Gibbs, then our Minister in Peru (now in Bolivia) had written to the State Department at Washington :

Foreigners residing in Peru will notice that there exists great antagonism against Chile; while apparently friendly as two sisters and neighboring republics of the same origin, there is a deep feeling of antipathy between them. It is difficult to give a cause for these sentiments ; the Peruvians say that Chile is overbearing and rejoices at any ill-fortune that may overtake her neighbors. I believe this feeling of ill-will goes back for generations, the Peruvians looking upon the Chileans with contempt during colonial times.

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\* The official reports of the various departments of the Chilean Government during the whole progress of the war, although they, of course, are impaired in value by omissions, nevertheless are remarkable for the fulness and clearness of the information which they do give. One of the most noteworthy is the report concerning the diplomatic negotiations for peace, presented only a few weeks ago to Congress by Señor Aldunate, the Minister of Foreign Relations. (Precedence in the Chilean Cabinet differs from ours in that the Minister of the Interior is the first in rank, and although the business of the Minister of Foreign Relations during the last five years has unquestionably been of the first importance, yet the order of precedence has not been changed.) Besides department and bureau reports, the two reports of Admiral Lynch as " General-in-Chief of the Army of Operations in the North of Peru " under dates of May 17, 1882,

languages, but almost without exception they are thoroughly partisan.

Of the more solid works two have been written in English and two in Spanish, and of one of the latter there is a French translation.

The commentaries in English are, first, an excellent, but strictly official monograph of the Chilean campaigns of 1879, 1880 and 1881, published by the Navy Department at Washington and written by Lieutenant Mason, of the United States Navy; who bears as his baptismal name that of an honored officer of this Society, Colonel Myers—a name associated also, in its repetition of that of Admiral Bailey, with the fame of a hero excelled by none in the naval annals of our country.

Second, a history of “The War between Peru and Chile,” carried down to 1882 by Mr. Clements R. Markham, an English gentleman too well known to you to need comment on his excellent capacity for such a work. But unfortunately Mr. Markham is so uncompromising in his championship of Peru that even by Peruvians themselves his book is deemed romantic in many of its narratives of events and estimates of personages.\*

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and May 17, 1883, are of great value. Also D. R. Cañas' *Lejislacion Militar de Chile* (2 vols., Santiago, 1882).

Of scarcely less importance than the Chilean official documents to a historical student are the official documents of the United States (besides Lieut. Mason's report on the campaigns) which bear on the subject, consisting chiefly of numerous volumes of diplomatic correspondence communicated to Congress, and of the reports (with accompanying testimony) of the Committee of the House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs (Ho. Doc. Report No. 1790, 47th Congress, 1st Session) as to “the connection of one or more ministers plenipotentiary of the United States with business transactions in which the intervention of the United States was requested between Chile and Peru.”

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\* A translation of Mr. Markham's book into Spanish has been made by Don José Rey y Basadre, a brother-in-law of President Calderon, of Peru, but the manuscript is not yet published.

The two works in Spanish are of Chilean origin. The first is a painstaking narrative of each campaign, by the fertile Chilean historian and essayist, Don Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, who was Don Annibal Pinto's competitor for the Presidency in 1876, and has for many years been a distinguished member of the Chilean Senate. Señor Mackenna became so kindly known to many members of this Society during his residence in the United States as an agent of his country in the Spanish war in 1865 and 1866, that any eulogy of his abilities would be superfluous. The second is a briefer treatise, undertaking to cover the same ground, by Don Diego Barras Arana, also a prolific writer, and a prominent but unsuccessful competitor, last year, for the Rectorship of the University of Chile. This is the book of which there is a French version.

But as in the case of our own civil war, so in the case of this war in South America, it is too soon for history to be written with knowledge of all the secret springs of action.

## VI.

From the beginning it was evident that the fortunes of the war must depend upon control of the sea. It does not need military expertness to see this. The topography of the field of operations makes it plain to the most inexperienced eye. In the belligerent countries there are a multitude of railways, but none of them runs parallel with the coast for any considerable distance except the State road which traverses the great central valley of Chile from Santiago to Angol.\* As the tide of success never turned so

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\* This road is 570 kilometres long, and has three branches, whose aggregate length is 147 kilometres. Total, 717 kilometres.

as to transfer active operations to that quarter, this road may be left out of consideration except as a very important aid to Chile in concentrating her forces. The arena of the whole combat lying north of Antofagasta, it was needful for the two navies to decide which of the belligerents should control the sea, for the sea was the necessary avenue of the transportation of armies. Military movement by land in the dry strip for any great distance was impossible by reason of the deserts. Six months were employed in settling this question of naval supremacy; and the process was like a game of chess when the board has been cleared of all the pieces except two bishops and a few pawns on one side and two knights and a few pawns upon the other. The wooden ships of Peru and Chile (Bolivia had no navy) corresponded with the pawns, and the two ironclads on each side with the knights and bishops.

Among her earliest movements Chile undertook a blockade of Iquique, and then withdrew her ironclads from it, leaving some wooden vessels there. A Peruvian fleet attacked them on the 21st of May, and the ironclad *Huascar* rammed and sank the Chilean frigate *Esmeraldas*; but the larger Peruvian ironclad—the *Independencia*—was fatally wrecked in chasing the Chilean corvette *Covadonga* too near the shore. So Peru lost one of her knights. The game she played with the other was admirable, but a losing one. The *Huascar*, on October 8, was surrounded by a Chilean fleet, including the ironclads *Cochrane* and *Blanco*, each greatly her superior in force, and was captured after a desperate resistance, in which the one martial hero of Peru, Admiral Don Miguel Grau, was blown to pieces by a shell, and of the four officers next in rank two were killed and two wounded, so that the surrender was



made by a lieutenant who at the beginning of the action was sixth in command.\*

After this Peru built two ironclads in Germany, the *Socrates* and the *Diogenes*, which were taken to England and detained there under neutrality laws; and an ironclad built by Chile in England, the *Arturo Prat*, was detained in like manner and has recently been sold. These all may be left out of the narrative.

From the time of the capture of the *Huascar* the Peruvian coast was at Chile's mercy. It was in Chile's power now to make military descents anywhere she pleased, and as soon as October 28, three weeks after the *Huascar's* capture, the first great military movement was begun by the despatch of General Don Erasmo Escala with some 10,000 troops by sea from Antofagasta to Pisagua. From Pisagua (which they sacked and burned) they marched inland along a railroad, and on November 19 fought and won the battle of San Francisco, against a combined Peruvian and Bolivian army under General Don Juan Buendia.† Iquique fell into Chilean possession on November 23 as a consequence of this victory. On the 27th of November a transient gleam of sunlight fell on the Peruvian arms by

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\* To illustrate the respectful esteem which Admiral Grau commanded even from the enemies of his country, I may mention an incident that came under my personal notice. While visiting Admiral Lynch, the Chilean commander in Peru, in his private apartments in the palace at Lima, one morning during the month of August last year, I observed a pile of pamphlets upon the floor near his writing desk, and on top one of them was open and the title-page exposed. It was entitled the "Corona Funebre de Miguel Grau, ó sean episodios de la salvaje guerra que Chile declaró al Perú," and was a narrative of the funeral ceremonies in memory of Grau, with a collection of poems in his honor—the whole dedicated to his widow.

† Lieut. Mason, in his monograph, p. 51, estimates the loss of the allies in this battle at 4,000, which, I think, is excessive.

the repulse of a pursuing Chilean column, near the inland village of Tarapacá, by the remnant of the allies' army in retreat from the hill of San Francisco across the desert toward Arica; but already the Peruvian political leaders saw that theirs was a lost cause without foreign intervention.

The day before the fight at Tarapacá, President Prado, after getting news at Arica of the battle of San Francisco, returned to Lima, and soon after his arrival made an unsuccessful endeavor to solidify all the political parties in the Republic by inviting the chronic political conspirator and revolutionist, Don Nicolas Pierola, into the Cabinet, he having manifestly become the popular favorite, not by development of any new merits, but by being known to be a man of energy and supposed capable of inspiring the Government with vigor to surmount its military reverses. But Pierola refused the invitation. He was nourishing more ambitious designs. Prado then, on December 18, forsook the country, on the pretext of going to the United States or to Europe to solicit foreign aid for Peru. A revolution instantly took place in Lima, and General La Puerta, the Vice-President, was unseated, the constitution of the Republic was abrogated, and Pierola was proclaimed Dictator. Almost simultaneously (on December 28) there was a revolution at La Paz, which deposed President Don Hilarion Daza, of Bolivia, and early in January he also fled from South America to Europe. General Don Narciso Campero was proclaimed in his place, and on June 5, 1880, was duly elected to the Presidency. The Pierola Government was recognized by ours and a diplomatic agent accredited by it was received at Washington.

The southern summer then passed almost away before

further military advances; but the Chileans blockaded almost all the Peruvian ports, ravaged the coast, and bombarded Arica in February and Callao in April, and again in May. Meanwhile they made careful preparation for a second expedition, to cut off another slice from Peru, using Pisagua this time for their starting point, as they had used Antofagasta the year before. General Don Manuel Baquedano was the commander of it. It consisted of some 15,000 troops, and began to move from Pisagua by sea on February 24, and disembarked at Ilo, a port in the Peruvian Department of Moquegua, northwest of Arica where the coast line turns westward after running almost due north and south the whole way from Chile. In the neighborhood of Tacna, about 40 miles north of Arica, the larger part of the disposable Peruvian and Bolivian forces were concentrated—the Peruvians under the command of Admiral Don Lizardo Montero, the Bolivians under the command of Colonel Don Eleodoro Camacho and afterward of President Campero in person. In April Baquedano began his march inland to cut Tacna off from its northern connections. On the 26th of May he gave battle to the allies and beat them with a fearful loss of life.\* Then, after occupying Tacna, he sent a division of 4,000 troops under Colonel Pedro Lagos against Arica, and on June 7 Lagos scaled the Morro there and stormed the forts upon its summit, bayoneting the garrison or driving them over the cliff into the sea. The Chilean fleet coöperated with a bombardment, the town was taken, and the

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\*The Chilean loss in killed and wounded at Tacna was 2,128. Lieut. Mason, in his monograph, p. 64, estimates the Peruvian loss as 1 000 killed, 1,500 wounded, and says about the Bolivians that their loss is "not given, but it is known that Daza's veteran regiment, the Colorado, was almost annihilated."

*Manco Capac*, one of the two Peruvian monitors, which was kept at Arica for harbor defense, was sunk by the Peruvians themselves. The Chilean despatches announcing the capture of Arica state the proportion of Peruvian dead to wounded as 700 to 100—again illustrating the incessant butchery after victory.\*

The loss of the battle of Tacna and the fall of Arica did not stagger the Government of the Dictator Pierola, as the capture of the *Huascar* and the loss of the battle of San Francisco did the Government of President Prado, for in their utmost despair the Peruvian people could see no chance of improving the vigor of their military administration by another revolution; and Pierola, with excellent judgment, diverted them from brooding upon the calamity by framing immediately a plan for a permanent federal union of Peru and Bolivia, designed to surpass that of the Protector Santa Cruz. On June 11 a treaty was signed at Lima by his Minister of Foreign Relations and a plenipotentiary of Bolivia for the federation of the allied republics into "a single nation called the Peru-Bolivian United States," with a delegation of powers to the national Government very like that made by the States of our own Union,† and on June 13 the Dictator issued a proclamation saying, "Yesterday Chile dreamed of our intestine struggles, but to-day Peru and Bolivia have but one voice and one thought. Chile sought to destroy the alliance, and all the harvest she has reaped is the making of the two peoples one only."

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\* See the first appendix to Minister Christiancy's despatch of June 13-14 to the State Department at Washington.

† See appendices to Minister Christiancy's despatch of June 20, 1880, to the State Department at Washington, for the text of the protocols of this treaty for a federal Union.

But this elaborate plan never has progressed any further towards accomplishment than the drafting of it upon paper, and indeed, ever since the Tacna and Arica campaign, so far from there being a growing community of interests and of sacrifices between the allies, Peru has sustained practically alone the military struggle against Chile. I do not know of an instance afterward in which a gun has been fired by the Bolivians.

After the fall of Arica came another period of preparation by Chile for a third descent upon Peru. This time she meant to strike at Lima, and meanwhile she continued the blockades and coast ravagings and sent expeditions from her ravaging fleet into the interior at many points to levy contributions.

## VII.

Pending this period there occurred on October 22, 25 and 27, 1880, the fruitless conference between envoys of the belligerents, on board the United States corvette *Lackawanna* in the harbor of Arica, under mediation of President Hayes' three west coast ministers—Messrs. Christiancy, Adams and Osborn. In this conference Chile demanded as conditions of peace: 1, the cession of the whole of the Bolivian littoral and of the Peruvian province of Tarapacá; 2, a money indemnity of twenty million dollars from Peru and Bolivia; 3, the abrogation of the treaty of 1873 between those countries, and annulment of all steps for their confederation; 4, an agreement by Peru never to fortify Arica again; and 5, the retention by Chile of the territory occupied by her forces north of the province of Tarapacá until the other conditions should be fulfilled. This demand Peru

and Bolivia rejected, and offered a money indemnity instead and denied the propriety of territorial cessions. They also offered to submit the question of the appropriate terms for a peace to the arbitration of the United States. But that proposal was peremptorily refused by Chile.

This is a suitable point in the narrative to remark that after the battle of Tacna Chile had no fear that Peru and Bolivia could by themselves wrench back the nitrate provinces from her grasp, and her attitude in the Arica Conference was a bold confession to the world that she meant to hold them at all hazards, regardless of the fact that at the beginning of the war her Foreign Office had solemnly disclaimed the intention of territorial conquest. Henceforth her only dread was of foreign intervention; and as to this, the United States were rendering her an assistance which was invaluable. Not only was our Government initiating a settlement of the boundary dispute of Chile with the Argentine Republic,\* but upon its construction of the "Monroe Doctrine" it was warning all European powers to keep their hands off, and

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\* With regard to this dispute and its settlement, see *La Cuestion de Limites entre Chile y la Republica Argentina*, por Carlos Morla Vicuña (Valparaíso, 1879), and *La Patagonia*, por B. Vicuña Mackenna (Santiago, 1880); also the diplomatic correspondence on the subject, communicated at various times from the State Department to the Congress of the United States; also the article Argentine Republic, and the accompanying map, by Señor Domínguez, Minister of that Republic at Washington, in vol. I of Stoddart's *Encyclopædia Americana* (New York, 1883). The treaty of adjustment was signed on July 23, 1881, and the ratifications of it were exchanged in October. For an English translation of the full text of the instrument see Minister Thomas O. Osborn's despatch of October 27, 1881, to the State Department at Washington. Some interesting allusions to this treaty as obliterating a provoking opportunity for antagonism between the two republics occurred on January 17, 1884, upon the reception by President Roca of Don Ambrosio Montt, as Chilean Minister to the Argentine Republic, the reports of which have to-day reached New York by mail from Buenos Ayres.

in numerous instances it had disconcerted approaches on their part for intervention. But for this warning there is a strong probability that Great Britain and France—one or both—might even have been tempted to deal with Peru as they have dealt with Egypt, for the assertion of the financial rights of the British subjects or French citizens who were her creditors to the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars, and whose security—the mortgaged manures of Tarapacá—Chile now had seized.\*

\* The following statement of the foreign debt of Peru as of December 31, 1881, has been furnished to me from an authoritative source. I do not accept responsibility for its exactness, but I vouch for the intelligence of the source from which it comes and the facilities for accurate knowledge which exist there:

DEUDA ESTERNA DEL PERÚ.				
Emision de 1870, á 6%.....	£11,920,000	0	0	
Amortizado.....	778,420	0	0	
				£11,141,580 0 0
Emision de 1872, á 5%.....	£23,215,000	0	0	
Amortizado.....	1,668,260	0	0	
				21,546,740 0 0
<i>Aumento á esas deudas.</i>				
Diferencia de capitales entre 6% interes de la emision de 1870, y 5% interes del emprestito de 1872.....	£2,228,316	0	0	
Intereses desde 1° Julio, 1878, sobre emision de 1872.....	5,237,495	8	0	
				7,465,811 8 0
Bonos vigentes de la deuda al Ecuador.....				7,706 0 2
“ “ del ferrocarril de Pisco á Ica.....				264,680 0 0
				£40,426,517 8 2
Intereses á 3% desde 1° de Enero de 1879, á 31 de Diciem- bre de 1881, segun convenio (Junio, 1876).....				3,638,386 10 2
				£44,064,903 18 4
Dreyfus Hermanos y Ca .....	4,008,003	7	7	
Hugues, Calderoni y Ca consignacion Mauricio.....	1,050,000	0	0	
Consignacion de guano de Estados Unidos.....	748,800	0	0	
				£49,871,707 5 11

There was another deterring influence in the fact that the creditors of Peru were not united. But the display of a disposition to interfere, on the part of Great Britain and France, would have overcome that, and have induced a union. In the absence of any such manifestations, however, the discord increased, and Chile fostered it by encouraging the British bondholders, who held about \$125,000,000 of the \$200,000,000 of the foreign debt of Peru (in these figures I do not include arrears of interest) with a hope that they could get more out of her than they could out of the original debtor. As early as June 24, 1879, she secured a resolution by their committee in London that it had "lost all faith in Peruvian promises" (which had been broken ever since January 1, 1876), and then she procured the appointment of an able agent, Mr. John Procter, to represent them in Santiago, with whom she entered into an agreement to deliver to them one-half of the proceeds of a million tons of the very guano mortgaged to them by Peru, pocketing the other half herself.\*

Soon after the arrival of Mr. Procter at Santiago and about the time of the capture of the *Huascar*, President Prado's Government at Lima, having satisfied itself that foreign interference of some sort was essential to the territorial salvation of Peru, had empowered commissioners in Europe to make some arrangement for that purpose, and these commissioners had entered into a contract with a

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\* A convenient manual for reference to many of the Chilean decrees concerning the hypothecated guano down to a recent date consists in a pamphlet entitled *Guanos*, por L. L. Zegers y A. Yañez, issued with the sanction of the Chilean Minister of Finance (Santiago, 1883). See also V. Pratolongo's *Contestacion al Informe de la Comisión Consultiva Chilena de Huanos y Salitres sobre la representacion de los tenedores extranjeros de Certificados de Salitre* (Genova, 1883).



French corporation called the *Crédit Industriel*, to support the plan of peace by a money indemnity without territorial cession. This corporation represented nearly all the foreign debt (some \$75,000,000) not held in England, and the main terms of the contract were that it should advance the sums needful for an indemnity, receiving in return an assignment of all the Peruvian nitrate and guano deposits, which it should administer to reimburse itself and to resume payment of interest on the Peruvian debt and to pay besides a certain sum to Peru for current revenue towards ordinary expenses of the Government. Señor Garcia Calderon's estimate of the value of the nitrate properties of Tarapacá—which I have quoted to you—will bear witness to the practical, though speculative, character of this agreement.

But Pierola, when he got into power at Lima, annulled this contract, and devised a plan of his own for raising money. With suspicious haste after his accession to the Dictatorship he settled the long outstanding accounts of a French firm of guano consignees by acknowledging a balance of some \$20,000,000 to be due to them, and at the same time he sought a loan from them upon fresh shipments of guano.\* The Chilean naval and military movements, however, broke up the arrangement for shipments, and after the battle of Tacna Pierola acceded to the *Crédit Industriel* scheme, with modifications which contemplated the assumption and payment of the balance he had acknowledged to this French firm, and also contemplated something like a guaranty or protectorate by the United States

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\* The firm of Dreyfus Brothers & Co., of whose members President Grévy, of France, was the personal friend and had been the counsellor at law. For an expression of President Grévy's views concerning the South Pacific war see Minister Morton's despatch of October 20, 1881, to the State Department at Washington.

of the corporation's possession of the guano and nitrates, to ensure the stability of the project; and agents of the *Crédit Industriel* were despatched to Washington to sound our Government on the subject. Before President Hayes' administration expired, Mr. Evarts, the Secretary of State, had pretty fully committed us to the plan in this shape.

But Chile, meanwhile, had taken her final military step and captured Lima, and Pierola had fled into the interior, and the "constitutional" party was in the ascendancy again, with an improvised government, having at its head Don Francisco Garcia Calderon as Provisional President.

## VIII.

There had been a division of opinion in the Chilean councils as to the direction of the next campaign to be undertaken after that of Tacna and Arica. General Baquedano advocated the capture of Arequipa and occupation of the railroad line from Mollendo to Puno on Lake Titicaca, thereby severing connection between Peru and Bolivia. But he was overruled at Santiago, and it was decided that the movement should be directed against Lima itself. In November, 1880, a month after the Arica Conference, Chile, using Arica for the starting point of her third great expedition, as Pisagua and Antofagasta had previously been used, began to land an army of 25,000 troops at various places on the coast of Peru, from Pisco north to within fifty miles of Lima, and before the new year they were concentrated and organized under General Baquedano in the valley of the Lurin, only some twenty-five miles from the capital.

There were two Peruvian lines of defence: the first about

ten miles south of Lima, stretching from the Morro Solar, a hill on the coast (resembling the Morro of Arica) just south of the beautiful town of Chorillos (the Newport of Peru), to a range of hills five or six miles to the east; the second about midway toward the city, also starting from the coast, and running east through the village of Miraflores, another beautiful summer resort. Behind these lines Pierola massed all his forces. Early in his dictatorship he had issued a decree calling under arms all Peruvians between the ages of 18 and 50, but exemption could be purchased at the rate of \$50 a month. His self-confidence led him to take the chief command in person, although he had no military education nor any military experience, save such as he had gained in four conspiracies and rebellions. General Buendia, the commander at the battle of San Francisco, and Admiral Montero, the commander at the battle of Tacna, served on his staff. The Peruvian troops outnumbered the Chileans,\* but they were not uniformly armed or equipped, and many of the battalions, hastily improvised from the citizens of Lima, were almost undrilled.

On January 13 the Chileans won the battle of Chorillos. The heaviest fighting was done on the Morro Solar, which was defended by General Iglesias and was stormed by the Chilean left wing under the command of Captain (now Vice-Admiral) Lynch of the Chilean navy. On the night of the 13th they sacked that town. On the 14th they advanced to the Miraflores line of defences. The next day, under the auspices of the diplomatic corps—our minister, Mr. Christiancy, among them—a truce was arranged as a

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\* In Lieutenant Mason's Report to our Navy Department he estimates the Chilean forces at 23,621, and the Peruvian forces at "about 33,500."

preliminary to negotiations for peace. But soon after noon the truce was broken and the battle of Miraflores was begun, the Chilean fleet coöperating with its heavy guns from the sea in the attack on the Peruvian intrenchments. Before sunset the Peruvians were again defeated, and this time were dispersed. Lima was at Chile's mercy, and Pierola began a rapid flight into the interior of the country, abandoning even the archives of his government to capture.

There had been an intention among the victors of sacking Lima, as Chorillos and Miraflores were sacked, but happily this was abandoned. On the night of the 16th the negroes and the lowest populace of the capital ran riot and threatened it with the same horror. On the 17th the Chileans marched in and restored order and established a military government. The port of Callao was occupied at the same time, the Peruvians first sinking the monitor *Atahualpa* and their few remaining wooden ships of war, which had been sheltered there.

The Chilean losses in the two battles were nearly 5,500, but the Peruvian losses were about 10,000; and of these nearly half were in killed. To what extent the butchery was carried after victory may be inferred by a comparison with the proportion of killed to wounded in our own battle of Gettysburg, where it was less than 1 in 5.\*

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\* With regard to Chilean depredations after the occupation of Lima, and to the refusal of quarter to any Peruvian belligerents from and after a date soon subsequent, see particularly *Le Chili et le Droit des Gens*, par P. Pradier-Fodéré (Gand, 1883), a paper submitted to the Institut de Droit International at its session in Munich on September 4, 1883. My own observation is to the effect that M. Pradier-Fodéré's censures are unjust in some particulars, but that many of them are founded in reason. (Some of his allegations of fact are incorrect.) It is inconsistent with the general enlightenment of the government of Chile that it should have authorized barbarities which are susceptible of

Pierola from the interior soon made overtures for peace ; but the Chileans refused to treat with him. A meeting of the principal citizens of Lima then was held near the close of February, which named Don Francisco Garcia Calderon for provisional President, re-established the constitution that Pierola abrogated and reconvened the Congress that he had dissolved. There can be no reasonable doubt that the Chileans connived at this with the expectation that Calderon and the Congress would agree to Chile's own terms of peace, and that the Chilean Government now had resolved that those terms must include not only the cession of the nitrate district but the occupation, with a probability of the acquisition, of Tacna and Arica also, thereby giving Chile control of the Pacific outlet of Bolivian commerce. But Calderon

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clear proof in certain details of the conduct of this war, and that it should tolerate, as it does, the display of booty from Lima in the parks of Santiago and even in the halls of Congress. See on this subject a letter from Lima, dated August 13, 1883, and an editorial article, in the *New York Herald* of September 7, 1883; also, concerning the hospitals of Lima, a letter of Don Ernesto Malinowski from Guayaquil, dated December 13, 1883, and an editorial article, in the *Herald* of January 5, 1884.

The plundering of the National Library of Peru at Lima and dispersion of its 30,000 volumes (500 of them valuable manuscripts touching early American history and geography) was an offence against mankind which admits of no excuse. Since the Iglesias government has been established at the Peruvian capital, an effort is making to reconstruct this library, and Don Ricardo Palma, the newly-appointed librarian (himself a meritorious poet and historian), solicits contributions of books and pamphlets for the purpose. But most of the ancient treasures are lost beyond the possibility of recall. This library was founded on August 28, 1821 (just one month after the declaration of the independence of Peru), by General San Martin, the liberator of Chile. His order for its institution—reciting that it was intended for an efficient means of reversing the ancient policy of Spanish government “that popular ignorance is the strongest prop of despotism,” and making it a free public library—is given in full in Señor Fuentes' *Estadística General de Lima* (2d ed.), vol. 1., p. 179.

speedily became an official party to the *Crédit Industriel* project contemplating money indemnity only.\*

President Garfield's Administration now had come in at Washington. Mr. Blaine, the new Secretary of State, for reasons which I will not debate, had taken up the policy favored by Mr. Evarts, of championing this mode of settlement, and infused it with vigor; and General Stephen A. Hurlbut, an intimate friend of Mr. Blaine, was sent to Peru to supersede Mr. Christiancy as our Minister there. Before General Hurlbut reached Lima, Mr. Christiancy, against his own judgment but in conformity to the wishes of Mr. Blaine, formally recognized Calderon's as the lawful government of Peru—which no other great power had done then or has done since. General Hurlbut, on his arrival, entered into close relationship with Calderon; and then a most astonishing episode began. Acting with vigor and ability which would have been admirable if exercised in operations of unquestionable propriety, Hurlbut weaned Calderon from any possibility of a compromise with the Chilean demands; exerted himself indefatigably to break Pierola down and build Calderon up; † made personal ap-

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\* His Congress concurred with him and very plausibly founded its objections to a cession of territory upon the following article of the Peruvian Constitution :

ART. 2. La Nacion es libre y independiente, y no puede celebrar pacto que se oponga á su independencia ó integridad, ó que afecte de algun modo su soberania.

But in the condition in which Peru was (and still is) the really binding force of a constitution upon any government is liable to be exaggerated in the estimation of citizens of our country who are unfamiliar with South American politics.

† Pierola, after a fruitless endeavor to maintain a Government at Ayacucho, ceased in November, 1881, from the exercise of any authority, and went to Europe early in 1882, and took up his residence in Paris. In November, 1882, he visited the United States and had an interview with Secretary Freling-

peals to Peruvian faction leaders for that purpose ; and publicly proclaimed, in the name of our country, in a letter to Admiral Lynch, the Chilean commander in Peru, on August 25, 1881, that the United States would support Peru in refusing to cede a foot of her territory to Chile until proof should be afforded of her inability to furnish a war indemnity to the victor in some other form.

There was a brief delay on the part of Admiral Lynch in answering this, owing to the approaching change of Administration in Chile by the close of President Pinto's term. On September 18 President Santa Maria came into office. On September 28 Admiral Lynch issued a military order suspending the Calderon Government, and on November 6

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huysen at Washington, in hope to secure some official expression from our government which would assist him in returning to Lima and becoming the negotiator of a peace between Peru and Chile, the Chilean authorities (discouraged in their endeavors to settle terms satisfactory to themselves with their prisoner Calderon during the autumn of that year) having made confidential overtures to him informally upon the subject. But Secretary Frelinghuysen withheld any such expression, and an interview which Pierola sought with President Arthur was avoided. Thereupon Pierola returned to Paris, first addressing to President Arthur, under date of November 30, 1882, a long letter, which was printed in full in the *Panama Canal* newspaper of January 24, 1883. On November 22, 1883, an interview with Pierola concerning the condition of Peru was printed in *La Estafeta*, a journal published in the Spanish language in Paris. On January 24, 1884, Pierola sailed from Europe for New York, where he arrived on February 4, and on February 9 sailed from New York for Colon, intending to go to Lima and take a seat in the Peruvian National Assembly, which is to meet on March 1 to ratify the peace negotiated with Chile by General Iglesias. A fellow passenger on the same steamer for the Isthmus (and occupying an adjoining stateroom) was ex-President Prado, whose departure from Peru in December, 1879, was the signal for the revolution which then elevated Pierola to the Dictatorship. See, on the subject of this last expedition of Pierola, the *New York Herald* of January 23, February 5 and February 6, 1884. The number last cited contains an interview with Pierola during his stay in New York, concerning the condition of Peru and the Iglesias terms of peace. The *Herald* of September 5, 1883, contains an interview with his fellow-passenger, ex-President Prado, upon the same subject.

he arrested Calderon and sent him to Chile in the ironclad *Cochrane*, and he still is kept a prisoner in that country.\*

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\* During the month of July, last year, I made a visit to Señor Calderon, at Rancagua in Chile, of which a narrative was printed in the New York *Herald* of October 8, 1883, that perhaps possesses some interest in connection with this allusion to his captivity. After enumerating the political prisoners deported to Chile from Peru (twenty three in all) the narrative continued :

By the term "prisoner" it must not be supposed that these Peruvian gentlemen are shut up in jails and wear handcuffs or balls and chains. With the exception of some favorites (such, for example, as Señor Quimper, to whom President Santa Maria is under bonds of personal friendship antedating the war) they are assigned to residence in disagreeable places, such as Rancagua, Chillan and Angol, and are allowed the "liberty" of the town, although they are kept under surveillance. Whatever the town affords that is comfortable in the way of food and furniture they are permitted to enjoy if they will pay for it. The same is true, with restrictions, as to their lodging; but in some cases (Calderon's, for example) they have been refused leave to keep house. He was refused that leave in Santiago, though the permission was granted to him later in Valparaiso. When Calderon was brought to Chile he was taken first to Santiago, then was removed to Quillota, to keep him out of Mr. Trescott's way; next was transferred to Chillan, and then was moved up again to Santiago, by request of Dr. Logan, the Minister of the United States, for the purpose of negotiation. After the suspension of the negotiation he was transferred, by his own desire, to Valparaiso, and there remained until late in June of this year, when the Chilean government ordered his removal to Rancagua because of a secret correspondence he was carrying on with friends in Peru that was deemed hostile to the Chilean projects concerning Iglesias. During all these wanderings he has been attended by his wife (to whom he was married in Lima in 1881, during his brief exercise of the Presidency), his mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, and a child has been born to him during his captivity.

Probably the condition in which I found him in Rancagua is an illustration of the manner in which his comrades have been generally accommodated in Chile during the last two years. The town is about sixty miles south of the capital and about 1,600 feet above the level of the sea, and is a wind-swept place, close to the snowy Cordillera, cold in the winter. It contains about five thousand inhabitants, spread over an immense area, is on the line of the great southern railroad which runs along the base of the Andes from Santiago to Angol, was the scene of a bloody battle with the Spaniards in the war of the liberation, seventy years ago, and, in celebration of that episode of its history, was officially entitled, after Chile achieved her independence, the "*ciudad mui leal i nacional*." I found Señor Calderon there in July (midwinter), lodged in what was called the "firemen's (*bomberos*) club-house," a one-storied adobe building, with a *patio* paved with cobble stones, damp and mossy, and with a muddy stable yard, reeking with filth of man and beast and containing an odorous pigsty. On one side of the *patio* were a barroom, a billiard saloon and an eating-room for the public. On the other side were three rooms, in which he and his family were lodged, two being occupied for bedrooms and the third applied to all other household uses. In this third room there were a tattered carpet, a dilapidated sofa, two or three rickety chairs and a table spread with the remnants of a breakfast which had been served with crockery of such coarseness and thickness that every piece of it might be a formidable missile. The window panes were soiled and the walls also. The President of Peru, clad with a cap and an overcoat, was striving to warm himself by



## IX.

President Garfield died on September 20. Guiteau's bullet did more execution than the assassin knew. It not only killed the President of the United States; it killed Peru's chance of territorial salvation. On October 27 Secretary Blaine began to "wind up" his continental policy, and telegraphed to General Hurlbut that "the influence of your position must not be used in aid of the Crédit Industriel or any other financial or speculative association."

The subsequent acts in the drama must be passed over more rapidly. Apparently in order to disentangle matters in contemplation of his approaching retirement from office

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pace up and down this room, there being (as usual in all but a few of the very best of the Chilean houses) no artificial means of heat except by burning charcoal in a brazier. A nursery maid was giving the infant, wrapped in shawls, an airing in a streak of cold sunshine that fell along one side of the *patio*. The ladies were shivering in heavy wrappings within the bedrooms. More dreary household accommodations, both interior and exterior, for a family of elegant refinement, used to surroundings of wealth and luxury, I seldom have witnessed. But they did not abate in any degree the courtliness of manner by which South Americans of the highest social station, and particularly Peruvians, are distinguished. Señor Calderon possesses no personal graces except such as come from this distinction, but those he has in fascinating perfection. He is about fifty years of age, heavily built, five feet seven or eight inches in stature, with a very large, round head and a singularly prominent, bulging forehead, thin brown hair, beginning to be streaked with gray, a thin beard and mustache, in which also some gray lines appear, and small eyes, light blue and so nearly almond-shaped that, with the thin beard, they impart to the face a curious suggestion of the Mongolian type. But besides his charm of manner there is the attraction of intellectual keenness which displays itself in conversation upon any subject outside of the merely conventional range, and no one can meet him familiarly without the consciousness that in following his lead the Peruvian constitutional party has been under adroit guidance, nor without suspecting that the Chileans have blundered in keeping him so long in a position where he could justify himself to the world in employing the utmost resources of artifice to evade his restraint.

A letter subsequently received by me from a friend of Señor Calderon contains the following passage:

About the lodging assigned to Calderon and his family at Rancagua it may be interesting to you to know the true significance of the term "firemen's (*bomberos*) club-house," given to the place. There is no firemen's corps in Rancagua. But in familiar Spanish, or rather South American Spanish slang, the phrase "*estar en bomba*" signifies "to be drunk." The owner of the establishment probably considered it ingenious to call it the house of the "*bomberos*," that is to say, literally the firemen's club-house, but actually the club-house of anybody who would like an opportunity to be "*en bomba*."

Mr. Blaine sent Mr. William Henry Trescot, one of our most experienced diplomatists, as a special envoy to the three belligerents, accompanied by Mr. Blaine's own youthful son as an assistant, but at the same time he armed Mr. Trescot with instructions which would enable him at his discretion to entangle them still more. They went first to Chile, only touching at Lima for two days (December 23-4, 1881) on their southward passage. Supposing that they were coming in the same spirit in which Gen. Hurlbut went to Peru, and indeed having been advised to that effect by the somewhat excitable Minister whom Chile was then maintaining at Washington,\* President Santa Maria, in anticipation of their arrival at Santiago, summoned the principal politicians into consultation and obtained from most of them encouragement to make at least an outward show of willingness to accept war with the United States sooner than our dictation of the terms of peace with Peru and Bolivia.†

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\* Don Marcial Martinez, now Chilean Minister in London. It would have been better for both countries if Chile had kept such a representative at Washington as Señor Ibañez or Señor Asta-Buruaga, both of whom had a better comprehension of this country than Señor Martinez. The blunders in diplomacy have not been exclusively committed by the United States.

† See, among other documentary evidence, the despatch of Mr. Lucius H. Foote, our consul at Valparaiso, to the State Department on December 9, 1881, the week after Minister Kilpatrick's death. (Mr. Foote is now our Minister in Corea.) He wrote:—

The Senate and House of Deputies have been in secret session for several days. The leading senator of the party opposed to the government said to me:

We are a unit. The United States may crush a sister Republic if she can afford to do so; but she shall not intimidate and dictate to us; we will die hard, and we will make use of every resource which God and nature have given us.

And, knowing as I do the temper of the people, I believe this to be the universal sentiment.

The palace of the Chilean Congress stands in Santiago upon a square a portion of which was occupied by the Jesuit Church that was destroyed by a fire on December 8, 1863, when more than two thousand women, celebrating a

There are those who believe that this was a sham, and

religious festival, were burned to death. It is a dignified and simple building, of Grecian architecture, with two porticoes facing east and west, in front of one of which stands a magnificent marble monument in memory of the victims of the fire, and in front of the other a marble statute of Don Andreas Bello, the compiler of the Civil Code of Chile. The main body of the building consists of a Hall of Honor for ceremonious occasions. The Presidents are inaugurated there. The halls of the Senate and the Deputies open into the wings out of this hall, and there are other entrances to them from the porticoes. In one of the wings there are also halls for a display of paintings and statuary; none of very great merit, some plundered from Lima. The chief of these is Montero's well-known painting of the Funeral Ceremonies of Atahualpa. (A heliotype of this picture is the frontispiece of Hutchinson's *Two Years in Peru*, which has been several times cited in these notes.) There are better collections in some of the private galleries in Santiago.

I am familiar with many of the legislative bodies in the United States and the Dominion of Canada and with some in Europe, and know of none that exceeds, and few that equal, the respectability of the Chilean Congress in its methods of business. There are peculiarities, the first of which that arrests attention is that the members do not rise to address the chairman, but remain seated while delivering their speeches. This gives the debates a conversational tone, and is a wholesome restraint on spasmodic elocution. Cigarette smoking is practiced during the sessions, and in cool weather there is a great display of foot-muffs. There are no desks; but a few tables are scattered among the arm-chairs. The public galleries are very small. The Cabinet Ministers occupy seats upon the floor, and are subject to personal interpellations. The privilege of interrogating them is exercised with great freedom and frequency. As both houses possess it, and as it forms a large part of the transactions, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies sit on alternate days. I had reason to suppose, from my observations, that almost any ministers would gladly escape from such an ordeal; and in a conversation one day with the Minister of Foreign Relations, in which Dr. Logan, the American Minister, took part, Señor Aldunate confirmed that impression, but left some doubt in my mind whether the preference for an abolition of the practice survives in instances in which one passes out of the Ministry into the regular ranks of the legislators and becomes an inquisitor instead of a victim.

The Senators and Deputies serve without salaries or perquisites. The only approach to a perquisite is in the lunch-room, which is supplied with cold viands and inexpensive wines. I was informed that the members of Congress are paid mileage and that they apply their receipts on that account to maintaining the table.

The Chamber of Deputies has 109 members, elected by the departments for a three years' term. The Senate consists of 37 members, elected by the provinces; their term is six years. The President's term is five years. The Congress meets yearly on the 18th of September. That is the Chilean Independence Day, corresponding with our 4th of July. The Presidential term also begins on that day.

that Chile would have succumbed if the United States had been firm and persistent. But the world never will know ; for the United States were not firm nor persistent. Mr. Frelinghuysen succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State at the beginning of the year 1882, and immediately any and all discretion given to Mr. Trescot to press Chile to a peace without cession of Peruvian territory was revoked ; and (what was specially mortifying to the envoy) our State Department let him learn of the revocation first from the Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations in an interview which had been sought at Viña del Mar for the purpose of carrying out the revoked instructions. In all the diplomatic history of the United States I know of no greater personal humiliation to which one of our envoys ever was subjected.\*

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\* Mr. Trescot arrived at Santiago on January 7, 1882. The instructions he bore from Secretary Blaine, under date of December 1, 1881, contained, among other important passages, the following concerning the arrest and deportation of President Calderon :

The Congress which assembled within the neutral zone set apart for that purpose by the Chilean authorities, and which was further allowed by the Chilean Government to provide for the military impositions by the use of the national credit, and thus recognized as the representative of the Peruvian people, authorized President Calderon to negotiate a peace, but upon the condition that no territory should be ceded. As soon as these facts indicated the possibility of a real and independent vitality in the constitution of the Calderon Government, the Chilean military authorities issued an order forbidding any exercise of its functions within the territory occupied by the Chilean army—that is, within the entire territory west of the mountains, including the capital and ports of Peru. Unable to understand this sudden and, giving due regard to the professions of Chile, this unaccountable change of policy, this Government instructed its Minister at Lima to continue to recognize the Calderon Government until more complete information would enable it to send further instructions. If our present information is correct, immediately upon the receipt of this communication they arrested President Calderon, and thus, as far as was in their power, extinguished his Government. The President does not now insist upon the inference which this action would warrant. He hopes that there is some explanation which will relieve him from the painful impression that it was taken in resentful reply to the continued recognition of the Calderon Government by the United States. If, unfortunately, he should be mistaken, and such a motive be avowed, your duty will be a brief one. You will say to the Chilean Government that the President considers such a proceeding as an intentional

After such an experience it is no wonder that Mr. Trescott's mission was perfectly fruitless. Its sole achieve-

and unwarranted offense, and that you will communicate such an avowal to the Government of the United States with the assurance that it will be regarded by the Government as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. You will inform me immediately of the happening of such a contingency and instructions will be sent you. But I do not anticipate such an occurrence. From the information before the Department, of which you are possessed, it is more probable that this course will be explained by an allegation that the conduct and language of the United States Minister in Peru had encouraged the Calderon Government to such resistance of the wishes of Chile as to render the negotiation of a satisfactory treaty of peace with the Calderon Government impossible. Any explanation which relieves this action of the Chilean Government of the character of an intentional offense will be received by you to that extent, provided it does not require as a condition precedent the disavowal of Mr. Hurlbut. \* \* \* It is difficult for me to say now how far an explanation would be satisfactory to the President which was not accompanied by the restoration or recognition of the Calderon Government.

Also the following concerning terms of peace between Chile and Peru :

Should the Chilean Government, while disclaiming any intention of offense, maintain its right to settle its difficulties with Peru without the friendly intervention of other powers, and refuse to allow the formation of any government in Peru which does not pledge its consent to the cession of Peruvian territory, it will be your duty, in language as strong as is consistent with the respect due an independent power, to express the disappointment and dissatisfaction felt by the United States at such a deplorable policy. You will say that this Government recognizes without reserve the right of Chile to adequate indemnity for the cost of the war, and a sufficient guarantee that it will not again be subjected to hostile demonstration from Peru; and, further, that if Peru is unable or unwilling to furnish such indemnity and guarantee, the right of conquest has put it in the power of Chile to supply them, and the reasonable exercise of that right, however much its necessity may be regretted, is not ground of legitimate complaint on the part of other powers. But this Government feels that the exercise of the right of absolute conquest is dangerous to the best interests of all the republics of this continent; that from it are certain to spring other wars and political disturbances; and that it imposes, even upon the conqueror, burdens which are scarcely compensated by the apparent increase of strength which it gives. The Government also holds that between two independent nations hostilities do not, from the mere existence of war, confer the right of conquest until the failure to furnish the indemnity and guarantee which can be rightfully demanded. The United States maintains, therefore, that Peru has the right to demand that an opportunity should be allowed her to find such indemnity and guarantee. Nor can this Government admit that a cession of territory can be properly exacted far exceeding in value the amplest estimate of a reasonable indemnity. Already, by force of its occupation, the Chilean Government has collected great sums from Peru; and it has been openly and officially asserted in the Chilean Congress that these military impositions have furnished a surplus beyond the cost of maintaining its armies in that occupation. The annexation of Tarapacá, which, under proper administration, would produce annually a sum sufficient to pay a large indemnity, seems to us to be not consistent with the execution of justice. The practical prohibi-

ment in Chile was the arrangement of a protocol of terms of peace more severe than those proposed at Arica in

tion of the formation of a stable government in Peru, and the absolute appropriation of its most valuable territory, is simply the extinction of a State which has formed part of the system of republics on this continent, honorable in the traditions and illustrations of its past history, and rich in the resources for future progress. The United States, with which Peru has for many years maintained the most cordial relations, has the right to feel and express a deep interest in its distressed condition; and while, with equal friendliness to Chile, we will not interpose to deprive her of the fair advantages of military success, nor put any obstacle to the attainment of future security, we cannot regard with unconcern the destruction of Peruvian nationality. If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be persisted in, this Government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the position which Chile has assumed, and will hold itself free to appeal to the other republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which cannot be confined to Chile and Peru, but which threaten with extremest danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all America. If, however, none of these embarrassing obstacles supervene, and Chile receives in a friendly spirit the representations of the United States, it will be your purpose: first, to concert such measures as will enable Peru to establish a regular government and initiate negotiation; second, to induce Chile to consent to such negotiation without cession of territory as a condition precedent; third, to impress upon Chile that in such negotiation she ought to allow Peru a fair opportunity to provide for a reasonable indemnity, and in this connection to let it be understood that the United States would consider the imposition of an extravagant indemnity, so as to make the cession of territory necessary in satisfaction, as more than is justified by the actual cost of the war, and as a solution threatening renewed difficulty between the two countries. \* \* \* If negotiation be assured, the ability of Peru to furnish the indemnity will be a matter of direct interest. Upon this subject we have no information upon which definite instructions can now be based. While you will carefully abstain from any interposition in this connection, you will examine and report to this Department promptly any plans which may be suggested.

On January 3 Secretary Frelinghuysen telegraphed to Mr. Trescot as follows, from Washington:

Exert pacific influence. Avoid any issue leading to your withdrawal from Chile.

It does not appear from the published copy of this telegram in the documents of the State Department to what place it was addressed or by what route it was sent. On January 3 Mr. Trescot was on his journey from Lima to Santiago. There was communication by telegraph from Washington to Santiago by way of Lisbon, Rio Janeiro and Buenos Ayres, but not by way of Panama. (The cables which now connect Panama with Callao were not laid until later in 1882.) But notwithstanding some confusion of dates in the official publications it appears probable from a despatch of Mr. Trescot to Secretary Frelinghuysen, dated February 3, that the telegram was sent by way of Europe, and that he did receive it on his arrival at Valparaiso on January 4. On January 4 Secretary Frelinghuysen sent the following telegram to Mr. Trescot to the care of

October, 1880. In this protocol Chile sarcastically offered to accept the good offices of the United States to induce

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our Consul at Panama, who was directed to forward it by mail to Mr. Trescott down the west coast of South America:

President seeks to extend friendly offices impartially to both republics. Exert pacific influence. Avoid issues leading to offense. The Calderon affair and its surroundings can be attended to here.

This was not received by Mr. Trescott till January 31. On January 7 an interview was had between Secretary Frelinghuysen and Don Marcial Martinez, the Chilean Minister at Washington, in which the Minister assured the Secretary that the Chilean Government "in the arrest and imprisonment of Calderon, was in no way instigated by an unfriendly feeling towards the United States;" and in a letter on the same day the Secretary requested him "to renew the assurance in writing." To this request Señor Martinez replied in writing under date of January 10 that "the doom of Calderon's Government was irrevocably sealed" by Chile because of Calderon's refusal to treat for peace "on the basis proposed by Chile," and added:

In the steps subsequently taken by the Government of Chile, that Government paid no attention to the proceedings of General Hurlbut, upon which the provisional president of Peru said that he based his reactionary conduct, but acted exclusively in accordance with its own rights. The fact is that my Government never believed that General Hurlbut was faithfully interpreting the lofty, considerate, and friendly policy of the United States Government. The first step taken by General Lynch (who had been duly authorized to do so) was to deprive Garcia Calderon of the arms which, trusting to his honor, he had lent him. Subsequently, when that gentleman's attitude became more dangerous, he was dispossessed of the bureaus which he had organized and was peremptorily ordered to perform no governmental or jurisdictional act within the lines of the Chilean occupation. Still later, when he intentionally violated this order, he was arrested and sent to Chile, but was treated with every courtesy and attention. \* \* \* I can and do assure your Excellency, in the most formal and solemn manner that my Government had not the most remote intention or the slightest purpose to impair, in any way, the state of friendship and cordiality which previously to those events, during the same and subsequently, has existed, and which it has always desired should exist, between it and the Government of the United States.

Secretary Frelinghuysen replied to Minister Martinez on January 16:

Permit me to convey to you my gratification in receiving your assurance that the Government of Chile, in its attitude toward the Calderon Government in Peru and its treatment of President Calderon, had no intention or purpose to impair in any way the state of friendship and cordiality which has always existed between it and the Government of the United States, and which it is the sincere wish of this Government may be perpetual.

On January 9, two days after the personal interview with Minister Martinez, Secretary Frelinghuysen addressed by mail a despatch to Mr. Trescott, as follows:

Since you received your instructions on your departure as Special Envoy to Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, I have sent you by cable two instructions. As I have

Peru to make peace by absolute cession of the province of Tarapacá ; by agreeing to the occupation of the provinces of Tacna and Arica by Chile for ten years, Chile to cede

not heard of your having received them, and to make their purport more intelligible than the brevity of a telegram would permit, I send this, stating the proper construction of your original instructions, somewhat modifying them, and indicating how they are to be executed.

The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any authoritative utterance to either Peru or Chile as to the merits of the controversy existing between those republics, as to what indemnity should be asked or given, as to a change of boundaries, or as to the personnel of the Government of Peru. The President recognizes Peru and Chile to be independent republics, to which he has no right or inclination to dictate.

Were the United States to assume an attitude of dictation towards the South American republics, even for the purpose of preventing war, the greatest of evils, or to preserve the autonomy of nations, it must be prepared by army and navy to enforce its mandate, and to this end tax our people for the exclusive benefit of foreign nations.

The President's policy with the South American republics and other foreign nations is that expressed in the immortal address of Washington, with which you are entirely familiar. What the President does seek to do is to extend the kindly offices of the United States impartially to both Peru and Chile, whose hostile attitude to each other he seriously laments; and he considers himself fortunate in having one so competent as yourself to bring the powers of reason and persuasion to bear in seeking the termination of the unhappy controversy; and you will consider as revoked that portion of your original instruction which directs you on the contingency therein stated as follows:

You will say to the Chilean Government that the President considers such a proceeding as an intentional and unwarranted offense, and that you will communicate such an avowal to the Government of the United States with the assurance that it will be regarded by the Government as an act of such unfriendly import as to require the immediate suspension of all diplomatic intercourse. You will inform me immediately of the happening of such a contingency and instructions will be sent to you.

Believing that a prolific cause of contention between nations is an irritability which is too readily offended, the President prefers that he shall himself determine after report has been made to him whether there is or is not cause for offense.

It was of this revocation of Secretary Blaine's instructions of December 1, 1881, and of the acceptance by our Government of Señor Martinez's explanation of Calderon's arrest and imprisonment as satisfactory, that Mr. Trescot learned first from Señor Balmaceda, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations, on January 31, the Chilean Legation at Washington having advised its home Government of them by telegraph, while our State Department left its Special Envoy in ignorance.

The circumstances and manner of Señor Balmaceda's communication to Mr. Trescot were related by the latter in a despatch addressed to the State Department on February 3, in which he reasonably expressed surprise and bewilderment.



them back then upon the payment of \$20,000,000 by Peru, otherwise to retain them permanently;\* by promising never to fortify the city of Arica if it should revert into Peruvian possession, and by conceding to Chile the mortgaged guano of the nitrate district and of the islands of Lobos in the north, to be equally divided between the Chilean treasury and the Peruvian bondholders, to whom the whole of it was hypothecated by the terms of the loans of 1870 and 1872. But Secretary Frelinghuysen was not ready yet to back down from the Garfield Admini-

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\* The significance of the terms "province" and "department" in Peru is the reverse of what it is in Chile. In the latter country the departments are subdivisions of provinces. In the former, provinces are subdivisions of departments, although, as in the instance of Tarapacá, it appears that there may be a political province which is not a component of any department. The provinces of Tacna and Arica, however, are parts of the department of Tacna, of which the following is an official description, of the latest date that has fallen under my notice. It was published in South American papers two years ago in connection with the Viña del Mar protocol, and purports to be the substance of an official report made in 1878, at the request of the central government at Lima, by Don Carlos Zapata, the Prefect of the department :

The department of Tacna is bounded on the northwest by the coast province of Moquegua, on the south by the province of Tarapacá, on the east by Bolivia, on the west by the Pacific. The department runs about due south-east and northwest, and embraces all between the river Camarones, which forms its boundary on the south, and the river Sinto on the north, a distance of about forty leagues. The line between the coast and the Upper Cordillera is about twenty leagues, so that the department may be estimated to contain eight hundred square leagues. It is divided into the coast and the mountain regions. The coast consists of a sandy, uncultivated belt, which is interrupted by the Camarones, Codpa, Chaca, Azapa and Lluta valleys in the province of Arica, and those of Sama, Tacna and Locumbá in the province of Tacna. This belt is between ten and twenty leagues in width. The mountain region stretches some fifty leagues through the Cordillera, and in it are found the Huallatiri volcano, which is between 14,000 and 15,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is in the province of Arica; the Yucamani, about 15,000 feet, which is in Tarata, and Candarave Tutaparca in the same province, and 16,000 feet high. The Tacora, 3,000 metres high, fronts the City of Tacna. The department is situated between 16 degrees, 40 minutes, and 19 degrees, 15 minutes, south latitude, and 71 degrees, 20 minutes, and 73 degrees, 25 minutes, west longitude. The capital of the department is the City of Tacna, situated about 486 metres above the sea, from which it is distant about twenty-four miles in a straight line. The department is divided into three provinces, Tacna, Arica and Tarata, the latter being almost entirely transandine.

stration's policy quite so far as this. On getting news of the protocol he telegraphed to Mr. Trescot that "in no event would the United States take part in negotiations based upon the surrender of Tarapacá and a further indemnity of \$20,000,000, as such a demand is considered exorbitant."

Shortly afterward Mr. Trescot left Chile for Peru, where his principal work was the recognition personally of Admiral Montero as the head of the Calderon Government—that officer having been elected vice-president by instigation of General Hurlbut during the previous year, shortly before the arrest and extradition of Calderon and in anticipation of such an event. Soon after this personal recognition Montero transferred the seat of his government from the north of Peru to Arequipa in the south.

General Hurlbut died suddenly of heart disease shortly before Mr. Trescot's return to Lima—and his death was hastened, I have reason to believe, by mental agitation concerning the variations of policy at Washington and the embarrassment into which they plunged him.

## X.

I am approaching now so closely to the present day, that I shall hurry the narrative more rapidly.\*

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\* Since the close of Mr. Trescot's mission in June, 1882, the State Department of the United States has withheld from the public its diplomatic correspondence relating to the South Pacific war, and with inconsiderable exceptions Congress has made no demand for it. The New York *Herald* last year made an industrious endeavor to remedy this deficiency in public information, and in pursuance of its undertaking printed a series of letters with editorial comments concerning the transactions covered in the withheld correspondence. To some numbers of this series reference has been made in these notes. The fol-

General Kilpatrick, Mr. Blaine's envoy to Chile, was dead also. An entirely new set of ministers was commissioned by President Arthur to the belligerent countries early in the summer of 1882, and the year that followed was consumed, so far as the United States are concerned, in a fruitless endeavor to induce Calderon, in his imprisonment, to agree to a peace accompanied with large territorial cessions—our Government retreating completely from its previous positions and counselling Peru that if she would not consent to cede territory the United States could not help her even with good offices.

Peru being thus reduced to despair, at last one of her citizens, General Don Miguel Iglesias, the soldier of the Morro Solar—who had been Pierola's Minister of War and later had given his adhesion to Calderon—set up a government of his own in the north at Cajamarca, with the motto "Peace at any price"; and last June Chile took him at his word, and having long ceased to feel any apprehension of constraint from our country, discarded the United States from the negotiations and framed a protocol directly with Iglesias, by which Peru agrees, subject to ratification by a National Assembly, to cede the province of Tarapacá; to give Chile possession of Tacna and Arica for ten years, a vote of their inhabitants then to be taken as to which country they shall thereafter belong, and the country

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lowing are the dates of the *Herald* which contain the principal letters and articles on the subject : September 7, 14, 17, 19; October 6, 8, 17, 24; December 26, 1883; and January 5, 1884. These *Herald* articles have been reproduced in the principal journals of Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, in Spanish translations. See also a pamphlet entitled *El New York Herald y La Guerra del Pacifico*, publicaciones hechas en el *Diario La Nacion de Guayaquil*, años de 1883 y 1884 (Guayaquil, 1884). A pamphlet edition of another Spanish translation of them has been announced in Chile.

chosen to pay the other ten million dollars ;\* to submit to Chile's disposal of the northern guano substantially as stipulated in the Viña del Mar protocol, except that a small part of the proceeds, after the ratification of peace, shall come into the Peruvian treasury ; and to consent to an exemption of Chile, so far as Peru has a right to make one, from any obligation whatsoever in respect to the Peruvian foreign debt, for which the guano and the revenues of the ceded territory were pledged as security. Having secured this protocol, Chile, operating from Lima, proceeded with her armies to crush out forcible resistance to Iglesias. At Huamachuco, high up among the Andes, on July 10, one of her columns, led by Colonel Gorostiaga, met and routed the forces of the Calderon Government which were marching under the command of General Caceres against Iglesias in Cajamarca. The Chilean loss in killed was less than 60 ; the Peruvian loss in killed was more than 600—another instance of butchery after victory. Then Chile brought Iglesias down to the sea coast and put him in possession of the revenues of the Custom House of Salaverry, the port of Trujillo. Next she brought him further down, to Lima, in October, after procuring his signature to the treaty in due form, with an additional provision that Peru shall pay for the maintenance of the Chilean army of occupation.† Then

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\* By recent mails from the South Pacific I have received letters officially postmarked "Tacna—Chile" by the Chilean officers in charge of the local administration there.

† A translation into English of the full text of the Iglesias peace treaty, and the additional protocol, signed on October 20, 1883, is given in a letter from Lima in the *New York Herald* of January 14, 1884. The Chilean Congress ratified it before adjourning on January 16.

One of the most interesting features of this treaty to publicists is its undertaking to exclude the foreign creditors of Peru from security which was pledged to them by the stipulations of their loans: The parties to the treaty

she sent an expedition to Arequipa, which captured that city in November and put Montero to flight; and now she is awaiting the meeting of the National Assembly on the 1st of March. The elections for it were held on the 13th of January. Meanwhile the main body of the Chilean troops has been withdrawn from the capital and is quartered among the ruins of Chorillos, and Iglesias is occupying the palace of Pizarro, over which the Peruvian flag, that disappeared on January 18, 1881, was hoisted again last October, after an interval of more than two years and nine months.

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openly undertake to do this. One of the clauses, after those providing for territorial cessions to Chile, reads :

Chile no reconoce, ni por motivo de guerra, ni por algun otro motivo, ninguna deuda del Perú, cualquiera que sea su naturaleza.

The international precedent on which Chile mainly relies is the cession of Alsace and Lorraine by France to Germany without the assumption by Germany of any proportionate liability to the creditors of France. Allusion also is made to the acquisitions of territory by the United States from Mexico. But the present case presents an extraordinary and, so far as I know, an unprecedented feature in Peru's special hypothecations of the revenues and the guano of the ceded territory to her creditors. The matter is considered with some fulness in the New York *Herald* of September 7, 1883.

President Arthur's administration has intimated pretty distinctly an opinion adverse to Chile's pretensions in this particular. See Secretary Frelinghuysen's despatch to Mr. Trescot of February 24, 1882, saying :

If Chile insists on retaining any of the territory whose products are or may be claimed by creditors of Peru as mortgaged or hypothecated, or in any other way made the basis of a loan, the President is not willing to involve the United States in the complications which might ensue.

How much influence this recorded intimation has had in restraining our Government from a formal recognition of the Government of Iglesias I will attempt to debate.

It was some time after the Chilean Government had proclaimed its irrevocable intention to insist upon the cession of the province of Tarapacá before it worked itself up to conceiving that it could avoid liabilities for the Peruvian debt, as accompanying that cession. The Arica Conference, on board the United States corvette *Lackawanna*, in which that intention was insisted upon, took place in October, 1880, and two weeks afterward, on November 10, Don

Since the capture of Arequipa, Bolivia also has negotiated for a cessation of hostilities, and envoys sent from La Paz to Santiago signed, last month, a protocol for a truce to last at least three years. The details of the negotiations have not yet reached us, but it is said that they include a project for a railroad from Antofagasta into the interior of Bolivia, for which surveys have been made by Chile. This is a work that Bolivia herself should have accomplished long ago, but never undertook because her financial credit was good for nothing and her Government was distracted by incessant revolutions. If she had achieved it before 1879 this South Pacific war would have been averted.

We are also as yet without precise details of the composition of the Peruvian National Assembly which is to meet in Lima on the 1st of March, but enough is known to warrant a belief that its title to be representative of all Peru will be liable to future dispute. The territorial area for the elections has been restricted by risings against Iglesias in the North, and by the military occupation of the departments of the Centre by General Caceres, who, since Montero's flight from Arequipa, is the surviving head of the Calderon Government. Of the delegates known to be returned, partisans of the ex-Dictator Pierola appear to compose a large

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Melquiades Valderrama, the then Minister of Foreign Relations at Santiago, issued a circular to foreign powers in which he wrote :

The surrender of the territory (*i. e.* of Tarapacá) involves on the part of the successful power (*i. e.* Chile) a recognition of the mortgages and incumbrances created upon it by Peru to her foreign creditors.

But the publication of this circular aroused discussions in the Chilean press and Congress which induced Señor Valderrama on December 24, 1880, to issue another circular retracting this specific construction of Chile's obligation, and leaving it indefinite. See Minister Thomas A. Osborn's despatches of November 23, 1880, and January 3, 1881, to the State Department at Washington.

majority. If I may hazard a prediction of what is to happen, it is that the Iglesias peace treaty will be ratified by this Assembly, such as it is; that the Chileans will accept the ratification as sufficient; and that soon after their army takes its departure Peru will become a prey to a fierce strife between factions headed by Pierola and Caceres—Iglesias disappearing from the scene on which he now is the prominent figure. I do not see that the terrible distress of Peru since 1879 has chastened the faction leaders into unselfishness or developed among them a sufficient conviction that their own implacable jealousies and rivalries are the main obstacle to the resurrection of the country from its misfortunes, and to the improvement of the great natural resources which remain after all that Chile has extracted. I foresee also a probability of some interference by European governments concerning the provisions of the treaty which refer to the foreign debt of Peru, but I do not venture to predict what form that interference may take.

## XI.

Now, as this five years' bloody drama draws to a close, let us reckon up some of the results.

Chile—victorious at every point in diplomacy as well as war—has discouraged European intervention with the aid of the United States, and at the same time has averted the intervention of the United States by her profession of willingness to fight sooner than submit to it; has brought Bolivia into antagonism to her former ally; and has so utterly subjugated Peru that if her own population were large enough to warrant such a policy she could annex the

whole of that country to her domains. But by reason of its paucity—not by reason of magnanimity\*—she satiates

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\*The following is an extract from a letter under date of August 17, 1883, published in the New York *Herald* of October 8:

On the day before I left Santiago, near the end of July, I called at the Moneda, as in duty bound, to take my leave of the Minister of Foreign Relations (Don Luis Aldunate) and express thanks to him for many courtesies that I had enjoyed in the Chilean capital. Our talk was a long one, and in it Señor Aldunate asked me what opinion of Chile as a nation I would take back to the United States. I answered that the most noteworthy impression I had of the public policy of Chile was that it is influenced by considerations and calculations of a sentimental nature less than that of any other country with which I was acquainted. He requested me to illustrate my meaning, and as our conversation was very frank I ventured to do so by the example of Peru. I said to him that according to my observation it was in Chile's power to rule Peru so that when its rule was withdrawn the Peruvians should regret its departure, and to conciliate their affections so that there need be no grave apprehension in the future of any attempt to pluck back from Chile the fair spoils of her victory; but that, on the contrary, Chile appears content to rely upon retaining her spoils wholly by the means by which she has gained them—that is to say, by force—and that she cares so little for the good will of the Peruvians that she feels neither surprise nor sorrow that they to a man will welcome her withdrawal from their capital, even though they know that as soon as she is gone they will fly at the throats of one another. Señor Aldunate did not refute these allegations, but replied:—"Chile is too small a nation, she has too little population and too perilous environments, to trust to calculations in her policy that have the element of uncertainty in them which pertains to all that are based on sentiment. Prudence requires her to leave nothing uncertain, to realize every reasonable advantage and to trust nothing to chance. It is only a very great and powerful nation—a nation of the greatness and power of the United States, for example—which can afford to run the risks of sentimental politics." I had to admit the strength of the Secretary's argument, but it does not convince me.

This letter was accompanied in the *Herald* by an editorial article from which the following are extracts:

Our correspondent finds the secret of the unvarying success which has attended Chile in diplomacy as well as in war during the last five years in the intelligence and patriotism of the ruling class, in the honesty and stability of the public service, in the contentment of the main body of the people to follow the rulers' lead without hesitation or even criticism, and in the freedom from feuds which is due to their unity of race. These several causes combine to concentrate the power of the Republic. It loses nothing from divided counsels or from lukewarm loyalty. Whatever blows it strikes are struck with all the vigor of which it is capable. If the population which obeys the command of the Chilean oligarchy were ten millions instead of only two and a half millions, our correspondent says, and with good reason, that Chile might shape the destiny of South America.

The peril of Chile, as a consequence of its amazing success, is that it will overestimate its capabilities. Already it shows itself greedy for an unmerciful measure of the spoils of victory and pitiless toward its vanquished foes. The germs of a thoroughly selfish ambition already are visible in its public policy, such as in other times and other lands has brought greater nations to sudden ruin. It is no less dangerous for a nation than for an individual to



herself with the appropriation of the nitrate district for which she began the war, and (what she hardly dared to hope at the outset) with the possession of Tacna and Arica—and thereby the control of the main outlet of Bolivia to the world, the permanent dissolution of the Peru-Bolivian

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shape conduct wholly by the head without allowing any play for the heart. In the revolutions of the whirligig of time a season is pretty sure to come to the one as to the other when self confidence fails.

The Iglesias plan for a peace between Chile and Peru, in which the United States are "left out" altogether, either as arbitrator or as mediator, is on the verge of accomplishment. It is a plan which contains the seeds of a more intense bitterness between the two republics than rankles even between France and Germany. It is not a plan which will suffer Chile to disband its armies or cease to keep up a navy disproportionate to the actual rank of the Republic among the nations. The peace for which it stipulates is one which, in the words of President Arthur in his last message to Congress, is not "likely to be lasting," because it is not "sufficiently equitable and just to command the approval of other nations."

The end of the struggle of the South American republics for primacy is not reached by the absolute triumph of Chile over Peru. On the eastern slope of the Andes and stretching across the broad southern pampas to the Atlantic Ocean there lies the Argentine Republic, which is bound sooner or later to try conclusions with its Chilean neighbor. But for the dread of Brazil the government of Buenos Ayres would have forcibly intervened in the west coast war. That dread may not be perpetual. The political future of South America is as full of uncertainty as the political future of Europe—even leaving out of consideration the possibility of European interference in South American affairs.

Señor Aldunate, having negotiated the peace treaty with Iglesias, and having concluded a definite treaty of peace with Spain (superseding the truce arranged at Washington in 1871) resigned his portfolio on January 18, 1884, and has been succeeded, as Minister of Foreign Relations, by Don Aniceto Vergara Albano. During Señor Aldunate's term of office he negotiated also treaties with Great Britain, France and Italy, for the adjustment of claims of their subjects or citizens against Chile, growing out of the conduct of the war with Peru and Bolivia, by mixed tribunals of which the Governments of those countries are each to appoint one member and the Chilean Government another, and the Emperor of Brazil a third as umpire. Since retiring from the cabinet he has been designated as the Chilean Commissioner in each of these tribunals.

There are numerous outstanding claims of citizens of the United States against Chile, also awaiting adjustment, and it is understood that the Chilean Government is willing at any moment to conclude a similar treaty with our country, with the same provision as to an umpire; but that, in consideration of the intimate secret relations of Brazil with Chile in the war, this source of appointment of an umpire has not yet commended itself to the Government of the United States.

confederation, and the ability at almost any time to force a war between those countries by instigating and helping Bolivia to seize Arequipa, Puno, and Mollendo.

As to her financial condition, her five per cent. bonds, which were quoted at 64 in the London market at the beginning of January, 1879, and fell to 60 in March of that year when tidings of the war reached London—were quoted at 95 at the beginning of January, 1884. In his annual message to Congress last June, President Santa Maria announced that the sinking fund for the foreign debt, which has been suspended since the war began, will be resumed this year, and when that is done Chilean credit will further advance and rank with that of almost any nation in the world. The foreign trade of Chile, which was barely sixty million dollars in value in 1878, has more than doubled since, and exceeded one hundred and twenty-five millions in 1882,\* and this did not include importations of war material; and the balance of trade was more than eighteen millions in her favor.† To

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\* The precise figures are, \$126,674,193, of which \$54,086,216 were imports and \$72,587,977 were exports, but \$1,092,779 consisted of "commerce of transit." See *Estadística Comercial de la República de Chile correspondiente al Año de 1882* (Valparaíso, 1883), p. 609. This total embraces the imports and exports from Pisagua, Iquique, Antofagasta and the other Peruvian or Bolivian ports in the territory seized by Chile and designed to be permanently held by her, as far north as Arica. (It does not include those of Arica.) The two principal items in the exports were nitrates valued at \$28,698,346, and copper valued at \$14,778,333. Of the \$54,086,216 of imports, \$22,586,495 were from Great Britain and only \$2,577,992 from the United States. Of the \$72,587,977 of exports, \$52,806,602 were to Great Britain, and only \$2,619,049 to the United States.

† How largely this brilliant showing is at the expense of Peru and Bolivia, is illustrated by the proportion which the commerce of the four conquered ports of Iquique, Pisagua, Antofagasta and Tocopilla bears to that of all the rest of the Chilean possessions. Of Chile's total exports in 1882, amounting in value to some seventy-two million dollars, their share was \$32,620,729. See *Estadística Comercial de 1882*, p. 64.

appreciate these figures bear in mind that her population is but two and a half millions and that the foreign trade of the United States, so lately as the year 1830, when we had a population of nearly thirteen million souls, was less in value than \$116,000,000. The Chilean revenue has increased in still greater proportion. In 1878, as has heretofore been stated, its receipts from all ordinary sources of income were only a little more than \$14,000,000. In 1882 they amounted to almost \$42,000,000. And besides reducing the public debt nearly seven and a half millions in that year, President Santa Maria announced to the Congress last June that there was a cash surplus of more than eight millions in the treasury, which must since have largely increased. Renewing a comparison with the United States, our national revenue was only about the same as that in 1850, when our population was more than 23,000,000 ; and had never exceeded \$40,000,000 since our national independence, save in the year 1816, when there of course were extraordinary importations after a long war with England, and in the year 1836, when speculation in public lands carried the receipts from that source of income alone up to nearly \$25,000,000.

The value of the agricultural lands of Chile has doubled within these five years, and that of its city real estate, by the test of rents in Santiago and Valparaiso, has more than doubled. But here again the paucity of population makes itself felt. Although wages also have increased, the demand for labor exceeds the supply.\*

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\* Among other curious results visible in Santiago— which has become one of the most interesting of the minor capitals of the world—it is opening some unwonted employments to women. The horse-car conductors in Santiago are women, and women sweep the streets.

## XII.

Nor is this all. Chile has not only advanced into the position of the controlling political power on the west coast of South America, but by her naval strength she can, if she pleases, at this moment command the Pacific coast of the United States. We are in a ridiculous position in relation to her. Any one of her three ironclads can sink every wooden vessel in our wretched navy, and the contrast between her ability and our impotence is a daily source of shame to every citizen of our country who resides or travels between Panama and Cape Horn.

I entreat your earnest attention to this disgraceful condition of our defences in the Pacific. General William B. Franklin, the distinguished soldier of our civil war, whose authority will not be disputed, has this winter been publicly warning us, in a written criticism of our "National Defences," that "there is no seaboard city of the United States that could not at this time be laid under contribution by a single hostile ironclad ship, which, after receiving the contribution or destroying the city by bombardment, could quietly steam out to sea without danger of damage from anything which any fort or ship of the United States can do." In hostilities between Chile and ourselves she could advance by sea to an attack upon California and Oregon, with a navy having three ironclads at the head of it, two of which are first rates by the standard of classification of such vessels, and any one of the three is more than a match for our Pacific squadron. Our only chance against any of them would be by boarding. Behind these ironclads is a large squadron of composite and of wooden vessels of war; and behind them a fleet of a dozen fine iron mer-

chant steamers subject to the disposition of the State in case of war and greatly surpassing our Pacific Mail Company's merchant fleet.\* It is strictly true already, as a competent French authority (Lieutenant Leon) has recently observed in a letter to the *Revue Maritime*, that Chile possesses such a navy that she henceforward must "enter into the calculations of any nation intending to undertake a war by sea." And she is preparing with her surplus revenue to buy more ironclads and reinforce her naval strength in many ways, at the same time that she is improving the port of Valparaiso by great expenditures with the design of outrivalling Callao and making it the emporium of the South Pacific as San Francisco is of the North.

I have no apprehension of war with Chile so long as cool-headed statesmen retain absolute dictation of her policy and control public opinion instead of being shaped by it. Their anxiety now is to harvest the spoils of their victories† and escape the peril of a corruption of the country by its vast increase of wealth and the extension of its domains into the tropics.‡ They know what the ultimate issue of

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\* In a letter from Lima, under date of August 20, the New York *Herald* of September 17, 1883, gives a detailed statement of the strength of the Chilean navy in comparison with the South Pacific squadrons of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Spain.

† As to the individual accumulations of wealth in Chile the pamphlet heretofore cited in these notes—Chile, by B. V. M. (Philadelphia, 1833)—says, p. 40 :

The great private fortunes are as numerous in Chile, considering its extent and importance, as in the United States. The Edwards family possesses a fortune of thirty millions ; the Cousiño-Goyenechea family, owners of the coal mines of Lota, possesses a fortune of fifteen millions ; the Matte and Brown families possess similar amounts. In February, 1882, there was published a list of seventy-eight Chilean millionaires, representing the sum of one hundred and eighty million dollars.

‡ Even yet, notwithstanding the cheerful examples of Chile and the Argentine Republic, the despairing prophecy of Simon Bolivar only a little more than a month before his death, when he might be supposed to be gifted

war with the United States must be, even though at the beginning they could mortify us. But all Chile has been growing in conceit in these five years ; and if it ever should mount to such proportions as to turn the heads of the Government as it has turned those of many of the people, a provocation to war might follow which could not be endured. Our defenceless condition in the Pacific is not safe—it is not compatible with those relations of power to power there which would be sure guarantees of peace.

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with almost preternatural vision, oppresses like a nightmare the best wishes for the success of Spanish-Americans in the application of republican government. On November 9, 1830, Bolivar wrote as follows to his friend General Don Juan José Flores, the founder and first President of the Republic of Ecuador. See *Four Years among Spanish-Americans*, by F. Hassaurek, late United States Minister resident in Ecuador (New York, 1868) p. 209 :

I have been in power nearly twenty years, from which I have gathered only a few definite results. These are :

1. America, for us, is ungovernable.
2. He who dedicates his services to a revolution ploughs the sea.
3. The only thing that can be done in America is to emigrate.
4. This country will inevitably fall into the hands of the unbridled rabble, and little by little become a prey to petty tyrants of all colors and classes.
5. Devoured as we shall be by all possible crimes, and ruined by our ferocity—the Europeans will not deem it worth their while to conquer us.
6. If it were possible for any part of the world to return to a state of primitive chaos, that would be the final state of Spanish-America.

Bolivar was born on July 24, 1783, and died on December 17, 1830. His personal experiences in the government of Spanish-Americans all were in the tropics. Surely, an ambition on the part of Chile to extend her dominions from the temperate zone into the region of such experiences, which is demonstrated by her conquests from Bolivia and Peru, warrants a fear of evil consequences to the character of her national life if that ambition is suffered to develop. But the career and the teachings of Bolivar are not a potent force in Chile. No pictured memorial of him adorns her halls of legislation ; nor any sculptured memorial of him her public places. Even in the Alameda of Santiago, among the numerous statues of illustrious South American leaders in the wars of independence his is wanting. The centennial anniversary of his birthday, so generally celebrated last year in the United States, was scarcely noticed in Chile. I was in Valparaiso on that day ; and neither from any public demonstration nor from any utterances of the press did I observe that the anniversary was signalized there by special reference to Bolivar's memory.

I beg you also to give a thought to the important relation of the presence of such a power as Chile is growing to be in the South Pacific, to our pretension of a right to control any Isthmus canal by virtue of our possessions in the North Pacific. You will not find a Chilean statesman who will agree to this pretension of ours, and England and France both will support Chile's resistance of it whenever the question becomes a practical one.

### XIII.

Nor is Chile likely to be the only South American country to dispute such a claim on our part. The unprecedented and unsatisfactory transactions of our diplomacy in connection with the South Pacific war have impaired the prestige of the United States among those countries to a degree of which neither Congress nor the people at large are sensible; nor will they become fully sensible of it, I fear, until serious troubles arise in consequence.\*

Only a little more than two years ago—as I have shown to you—Secretary Blaine's plan of dictation of terms of peace to the warring republics had committed our Government, through Minister Hurlbut, to the defence of Peru so fully that we were on the verge of becoming an active party to the hostilities before anybody here, outside of a small official circle, was aware of the progress of such a policy. It was not till after the retirement of Mr. Blaine from office that the full proportions of the project were re-

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\* Mr. Blaine's continental policy seems to have contemplated the possible occupation of the Galapagos Islands by the United States on a theory of their abandonment by the Republic of Ecuador. See a letter by Don Antonio Flores, and an editorial article, in the New York *Herald* of May 26, 1883.

vealed to general apprehension. Then occurred a short spasm of alarm, in which the public caught with surprise a glimpse of its magnitude, and it was seen that, if pushed to its conclusions, it would have embroiled us not only with South American powers (that would have been but the initial point), but with European powers also, and have superseded all other issues in our domestic politics; and critics were not lacking to impute such a change of home issues to Mr. Blaine as a deliberate purpose to maintain his party and himself in possession of the Federal Government. I know that Mr. Blaine vehemently denies such an intention, and avers that if President Garfield had lived his South American policy would have reached a successful end without the United States firing a gun. But history must oppose to this disclaimer the show of willingness by the controlling politicians of Chile to accept war with us rather than submit to our regulation of the terms on which they should make peace with Bolivia and Peru; and also the facts that they were assured, in advance, of the sympathy of the Empire of Brazil, and were confident of that of all the Spanish-speaking republics except the two whose alliance the United States would have reinforced, and that they counted upon the support of Great Britain at an early stage of hostilities. Nor have I so small esteem for Mr. Blaine as to deem him capable of violating the maxim of the Duke of Wellington, that "A great country never ought to make little wars"—however much this maxim has been ignored of late by its author's own country. I put too high an estimate upon Mr. Blaine's scope of statesmanship to believe that he did not comprehend and contemplate the widest extension of the combat into which his foreign policy was possibly conducting the United States. To



suppose otherwise would be disrespectful to his intelligence. But any closer inspection of this matter might involve personal criticisms inappropriate to this platform, and I forbear.

The radical change of our foreign policy by President Arthur's Administration certainly has averted the complications into which Secretary Blaine was conducting the United States ; but it has done so with a sacrifice.

By the Peruvians, who were incited by Mr. Blaine and his diplomatic agents to persist in the war with Chile in hope that we would come to their succor, and whom Mr. Frelinghuysen has abandoned to the scanty mercy of their enemies, it is regarded as a sacrifice of our national honor.\*

By the Chileans, in whose dictation of their own terms

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\* For a temperate and strongly argued expression of this view of the subject, see the article of the Peruvian jurist and diplomatist, Don Evaristo Gomez Sanchez, contributed to the New York *Herald* of October 17, 1883. See also the Ex-Dictator Pierola's letter to President Arthur, under date of November 30, 1882, printed in the Panama *Canal* newspaper of January 24, 1883; and also a letter of Don Ernesto Malinowski to M. Pascal Duprat, the French Minister in Chile, printed in the New York *Herald* of September 7, 1883. Further examples might be cited, at great length, but the foregoing are sufficient to attest the prevalence of this feeling toward the United States among all parties in Peruvian politics. It deserves remark, however, that the strictures of Señores Gomez Sanchez, Pierola and Malinowski, in the above-named publications, so far as they relate personally to Dr. Cornelius A. Logan, the present Minister of the United States in Chile, were made in entire ignorance of the instructions of Secretary Frelinghuysen to Dr. Logan and his late colleagues, Mr. Partridge in Peru, and Mr. Maney in Bolivia, and of the relation of Mr. Partridge's failure to execute his part of those instructions to Dr. Logan's proceedings. During the summer of 1883 Mr. Partridge was superseded at Lima by Mr. Seth L. Phelps and Mr. Maney at La Paz by Mr. Richard Gibbs. The avoidance of our State Department to disclose to the public or to Congress its correspondence with Ministers Logan, Partridge and Maney leaves Dr. Logan in the position of a scapegoat loaded with all the blunders of the Washington Administration and all the curses of the Peruvian politicians, until such a disclosure shall be fully made.

of peace President Arthur's Administration has passively acquiesced, although styling them "exorbitant," it is regarded as a sacrifice of our national pride.

By all the other South American countries, which have beheld the United States retreat from active interference between the belligerents into passive concession of the right of Chile to wreak her will upon her prostrate foes, it is regarded as a sacrifice of our pretension to political primacy in the international relations of the hemisphere.

At the time of the outbreak of this war in 1879 that primacy was acknowledged more fully than ever before by every South American State. It had been memorably illustrated thrice during the preceding twenty years; first, when the possible disruption of our Union encouraged Spain to invade Santo Domingo upon the invitation of Pedro Santana, with the design of extinguishing the Dominican Republic and reannexing its territory to her crown; second, when Mexico was invaded by allied forces of Great Britain, Spain and France, presuming on our temporary inability to help our neighbor; and third, when a Spanish admiral, under orders from his Government, presuming still upon our paralysis, seized the Chincha Islands and forced war with Peru.

The subjugation of our rebellion was the signal for the defeat of all these European encroachments upon American republics. General Lee surrendered his rebel army on April 9, 1865; but already, in anticipation of the downfall of the Southern Confederacy and the unshackling of our hands to revindicate the "Monroe Doctrine," the Spanish Cortes had acknowledged the independence of Santo Domingo on the 3d of March. Soon ensued the revolution in Lima which displaced President Pezet and led to the

repudiation of an ignoble treaty of peace he had negotiated with Spain, and to the alliance of Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia with Peru, in January, 1866, which was followed by the wanton bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spaniards in March and the repulse of their fleet from Callao in May.\* Next came the withdrawal of the French army from Mexico early in 1867, compelled by the remonstrances of the United States; and then the downfall, the capture and the execution of Maximilian. And finally ensued the truce between Spain and the allied South American republics, negotiated at Washington in 1871.

All these vindications of the freedom of this hemisphere from European encroachments are directly traceable to the restoration of the United States to a normal primacy among American powers upon the close of our Civil War; and such exertions and exhibitions of authority as these had gained for the United States a relation to the South American republics surpassing in influence any we had enjoyed since our recognition of their independence.

That is the relation which we have forfeited. This penalty of the forward and backward course of policy at Washington has scarcely arrested public attention. We shall have occasion to be sorry for our indifference to it whenever Peru—rejected by ourselves—seeks, as I believe

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\* For the most recent Spanish and Chilean commentaries on this war, see the *Historia de la guerra de España en el Pacifico*, por el Teniente de Navio de la Marina Española, Don Pedro de Novo y Colson (Madrid, 1883), and a reply, entitled *Historia de la guerra de Chile con España de 1863 á 1866*, por B. Vicuña Mackenna, published at Santiago later in the same year (1883).

It would be a curious subject for investigation and discussion how much a conceit developed among the Peruvians by the successful defence of Callao had to do with their future relations with Chile, and whether the subsequent history of the two republics might not have been one of friendship if Peru had suffered at Callao on the 2d of May, 1866, what Chile suffered at Valparaiso on the 31st of March.

she inevitably will before many years, a European protectorate to screen her from the fiendish ambitions and discords to which Chile leaves her a victim. Then will come a test of our "Monroe Doctrine," to which we cannot afford to be indifferent.

Fortunate, also, shall we be if the conceit of Chile, in consideration of the defenceless condition of our Pacific possessions, does not at an even earlier day make us regret our insensibility to the impairment of our esteem and influence in South America. The people of the United States learned of Mr. Blaine's gamecock policy and of Mr. Frelinghuysen's retrocession from it so nearly simultaneously that—treating the whole business as a finished transaction—it dismissed with complacency the international relations of the matter from its mind (if, indeed, it ever comprehended them at all) and fastened attention upon personal scandals which are very subordinate incidents. Cochet and Landreau claims, and the *Crédit Industriel*, and that marvelous concoction of American ingenuity, Shipherd's Peruvian Company, have been overhauled by Congressional committees with an eager desire on the part of some factions to smut the reputation of persons prominent in politics with evidence of corruption; and with as eager desire on the part of other factions to shield those reputations at all hazards. The press has reeked with defamation of individuals concerning the South Pacific war. But amid the uproar the much more important facts of our elimination from the position of mediator and moderator among the nations of this hemisphere, and of the rise of this vigorous little Republic of Chile to be the first American power in the Pacific, upon the wreck of Peru, have been almost excluded from consideration.